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I. INTRODUCTION
This human rights report documents and analyzes instances in
which the Massachusetts family courts are violating
internationally accepted human rights laws and standards. The
report focuses specifically on cases involving child custody and
visitation issues where there is a history of partner abuse. In the
vast majority of examples discussed in the report, the family
courts also are violating Massachusetts law and policy.
Our findings are based primarily on the in-depth testimonies of
40 battered mothers who experienced family court litigation in 11
of the 14 counties in Massachusetts. 1
In November of 2002, the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project at the
Wellesley Centers for Women released Battered Mothers Speak Out: A
Human Rights Report on Domestic Violence and Child Custody in the
Massachusetts Family Courts. The report told the stories of forty battered
mothers who had been involved in litigation in the Massachusetts family
courts and argued that these courts had violated the human rights of the
battered mothers and their children.2 Specifically, the report argued that
Massachusetts' family courts had committed six distinct human rights
violations:
1. Failure to protect battered women and children from abuse.
2. Discrimination and bias against battered women.
3. Degrading treatment of battered women.
4. Denial of due process to battered women.
5. Allowing the batterer to continue the abuse through the family courts.
6. Failure to respect the economic rights of battered women and children.3
While battered women's advocates applauded the study and a
mainstream media outlet in Massachusetts noted that "if only a fraction of
what these women say is true, it's bad news for Massachusetts,"4 the official
1. CARRIE CUTHBERT ET AL., BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETrS FAMILY COURTS
iv (Wellesley Centers for Women 2002) [hereinafter BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT].
2. Id. To be included in the study, a woman had to: be a mother; have experienced
violence from an intimate partner with whom she had children and with whom she no longer
resided; have engaged in custody litigation with that abusive former partner in the
Massachusetts family courts; express grievances about family court processes and/or actors
and/or perceive that her human rights might have been violated by family court actors; and be
willing to speak with a documenter. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 14.
4. Editorial, Witnesses to Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2002, at A18.
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response from the court system was discouraging.' Chief Justice Sean M.
Dunphy of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Courts stated that the
study's "methodology is flawed," because "the study relied on testimony
only from women with complaints about custody decisions and not from
those satisfied with rulings."6 While Dunphy said he respected the report, he
suggested that the women's accounts of their experiences did not justify the
report's conclusions, believing that "the women's testimony would have
been strengthened if it were verified by thorough review of court records
and interviews with lawyers in the cases."7
Although it initially generated a great deal of attention, the report of the
Battered Mothers' Testimony Project did not prompt the Massachusetts
family court system to institute reforms based on its findings and
recommendations.8 But why not? Why have the stories of the forty women
involved, bolstered by the accounts of advocates for battered women and
their children, failed to persuade the Massachusetts court system that
serious reform is needed to safeguard the rights, dignity, and safety of
battered women and their children?9
One possible answer to that question lies in the way in which the data
collected and relied upon by the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project was
5. Privately, however, some judges expressed concern about the points raised by the
report. One judge asked one of the authors what she should do to change her court; other judges
circulated "what do we do now?" memos. Mark F. Massoud, The Influence of International Law
on Local Social Movements 26 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
6. Rhonda Stewart, Advocates Attest to Abuse Study Findings Call for Overhaul of
Family Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2002, at 1. Not all of the criticism came from women
who received adverse rulings, however. Moreover, some of the human rights violations found
by the project-most notably, the degrading treatment of battered women in the court system
and the system's permitting the batterer to use the court as a forum to continue his abuse-are
not complaints about specific rulings, but about court processes. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK
OUT, supra note 1, at 48, 64.
7. Patricia Wen, Report Assails Family Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2002, at B2.
Carrie Cuthbert, the lead author of the report, noted that such fact checking had been done in
roughly twenty-five percent of the cases. Id. In those ten cases, the women's accounts were
verified. Kristen Lombardi, Custodians of Abuse, BOSTON PHOENIX, Jan. 9-16, 2003,
http://www.unitedforjustice.com/custodiansl.htm.
8. Carrie Cuthbert, Battered Mothers vs. U.S. Family Courts, 2 HuM. RTS. DIALOGUE 12,
13 (Fall 2003), available at http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/printerfriendlymedia.php/
prmlD/1047. However, the report apparently prompted the court system to engage in a self-
study. In August 2003, the Administrative Office of the Trial Court released Progress and
Challenges: Viewpoints on the Trial Court's Response to Domestic Violence. The report
employs a similar methodology and reaches many of the same conclusions as Battered Mothers
Speak Out and will be discussed further infra.
9. Narratives have proven a powerful force for change in other contexts-for example,
the legislative arena. See generally Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power
of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993).
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presented-as the narratives of battered women. ° Dunphy based his
dismissal of the report on his belief that the report did not constitute "good"
social science ("the methodology is flawed") because it relied on the stories
of women and because those women's stories did not convince him that the
courts truly had problems that needed to be addressed. By relying on
narrative, or "qualitative" research, the Battered Mothers' Testimony
Project gave state actors a convenient excuse for disregarding its findings-
the report simply wasn't scientific enough to be believed.
This article challenges the assumption that narrative constitutes "bad"
science and argues that narratives can illuminate problems in court systems,
justifying reforms. The article begins by examining the methodology,
findings and conclusions of the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project. The
article then examines the use of narrative in social science, human rights
investigations, and the law and argues that qualitative work is valued in all
of those settings. Why, then, the unwillingness to credit the narratives of
these battered mothers? The article illustrates that the unwillingness to see
these narrative accounts as indicative of larger problems within the court
system is tied to a tendency to discount women's voices, by looking to both
the social science and legal literature on this topic and the gender bias
studies conducted by many courts in the 1980s and 1990s."
10. This is, of course, only one possible answer, although I believe a very plausible one.
The authors of the report believe that the judges were upset that the report failed to acknowledge
the work that the court had done to improve its handling of family law cases involving domestic
violence-a criticism that surprised the authors, given that "the report did include a section
highlighting past achievements." Kim Slote, Assessing the Impact of the Battered Mothers'
Testimony Project 3 (2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). Slote also believes
that people were surprised that they did not produce a typical policy paper or neutral review of
the system and sought to distance themselves from it for political reasons. Telephone interview
with Kim Slote, Human Rights Consultant, U.S. Human Rights Network, in Naples, Fla. (Sept.
29, 2004). Other possible reasons could include that the narratives came from poor women or
women of color. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
11. The Battered Mothers' Testimony Project grew, in part, from a study commissioned
by Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court in 1989 that found that gender bias in the courts was
largely being ignored. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1. As Dorothy Roberts notes, focusing on
gender as the primary reason for oppression "forces women of color to fragment their
experience in a way that does not reflect the reality of their lives." Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1991) (footnote omitted). My choice to focus on the
gender-specific dimensions of the response to the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project is not
meant to create such fragmentation, or to ignore the role that race likely played in the
discounting of these narratives. Indeed, Battered Mothers Speak Out documents bias the
mothers experienced based on race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation.
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 37-39. While the intersection of gender bias
and bias based on factors other than gender is touched on in this article, the article does not
purport to thoroughly examine those issues.
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Finally, the article asks whether the weight given to narratives about the
operation of the court system is changed by the identity of the reporter or
the type of report, comparing the effectiveness of first and third person
narrative reports and qualitative and quantitative court reports. While third
person or quantitative reports may initially be more credible to judges and
decision-makers, using such strategies denies battered women the
opportunity to tell their stories and denies judges the opportunity to develop
empathy by hearing them. Ultimately, silencing women's voices in order to
gain widespread acceptance further undermines attempts to reinforce
women's credibility. The discounting of women's voices may continue to
impede projects like the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project from
achieving meaningful change; nonetheless, collecting and disseminating the
narratives of women affected by the system should be a crucial component
of court reform.
II. THE BATTERED MOTHERS' TESTIMONY PROJECT
Battered Mothers Speak Out, the report of the Massachusetts Battered
Mothers' Testimony Project, was the first family court report to view the
difficulties faced by battered mothers in the court system through a human
rights lens.' 2 Using human rights norms articulated in documents like the
United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the report
catalogued the human rights violations committed against battered mothers
by the Massachusetts family courts. 3
12. While Massachusetts' study was the first, it is not the only Battered Mothers'
Testimony Project in existence. In June 2003, the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence
released a report entitled Battered Mothers' Testimony Project: A Human Rights Approach to
Child Custody and Domestic Violence. Modeled on the Massachusetts report, the Arizona study
collected the stories of fifty-seven women to support its claim that battered mothers involved in
custody actions in the Arizona Superior Court system were being subjected to human rights
abuses. Arizona's study reports its findings in a more traditional, qualitative way, providing
statistics based on the answers given by respondents in the study, augmented by quotes that are
not linked to particular mothers and short anonymous case descriptions.
Because the study does not primarily rely on narrative to bolster its arguments about the
presence of human rights abuses, it will not be a major focus of this article. The short stories
that are relayed at various points in the report, however, echo the stories told by the mothers in
Massachusetts. See ARIZ. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, BATTERED MOTHERS'
TESTIMONY PROJECT: A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO CHILD CUSTODY AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE at 60-61 (failure to take partner abuse seriously), 75 (denial of due process right to
be heard), 76-77 (bias against battered women) (2003). The study concludes that "domestic
violence in Arizona is torture and ... the failure of Arizona's legal system to prevent torture
places the state in non- ompliance with international laws and norms that condemn torture." Id.
at 86.
13. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 9-12.
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Battered Mothers Speak Out begins by establishing the government's
responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of its citizens.'
4
In the context of the Massachusetts family courts, respecting, protecting,
and fulfilling these rights requires that courts not only "refrain from directly
violating the human rights of women and children through their actions" but
also "take positive steps to protect children and women from abuse by non-
state actors such as ex-husbands, ex-boyfriends, and fathers."' 5 "Respect"
centers on the actions that the court system takes directly through its "laws,
agents, and systems;" respect includes the requirement that courts not
discriminate against battered women.' 6 To "protect" battered women and
their children, the Massachusetts family courts must ensure that private
individuals (batterers) are not permitted to violate women's and children's
human rights-for example, by using the court system to continue their
abuse or by exposing women and children to danger through unsafe
visitation arrangements. 7 To "fulfill" their human rights, the court system
must take active measures to ensure that battered women "have the
opportunity to obtain satisfaction of their needs (where recognized in
human rights laws and instruments) that cannot be secured by their own
personal efforts."' 8 Examples of fulfilling battered women's human rights
include providing battered women with "access to shelter and the economic
resources needed to flee their abusers and establish an independent, safe
life." 9 The report locates the courts' responsibility to respect, protect, and
fulfill battered women and their children's rights in several sources: the
human condition,2" documents binding the United States as a condition of
its membership in the United Nations, including the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women ("which defines violence against women as a human rights
violation and delineates governments' obligations to end and prevent it"),"'
and treaties that the United States has signed but not ratified, including
United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Using this framework, the
report investigated three broad questions:
14. Id. at 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 10-11.
21. Id. at 11.
22. Id.
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(1) Are the Massachusetts family courts respecting, protecting,
and fulfilling battered mothers' and their children's fundamental
human rights to: [b]odily integrity and freedom from violence;
[n]on-discrinination and equal protection of the law; [freedom
from torture and degrading treatment; [d]ue process; [fireedom of
speech and a fair hearing; and [a]dequate standard of living[?]
(2) Are the Massachusetts family courts exercising due
diligence with respect to violence against women and children?
(3) Are the Massachusetts family courts acting in children's
best interests in child custody and visitation cases where there is a
history of partner and/or child abuse?
23
The answer to all of these questions, according to Battered Mothers
Speak Out, is no. The report found that the family courts committed human
rights violations in the following areas:
1. Failure to protect battered women and children from abuse
2. Discrimination and bias against battered women
3. Degrading treatment of battered women
4. Denial of due process to battered women
5. Allowing the batterer to continue the abuse through the family
courts
6. Failure to respect the economic rights of battered women and
children. 4
The report examines each of these violations in turn, using the
narratives of battered mothers to bolster its findings.
25
According to the report, the Massachusetts family courts fail to protect
battered women and children from abuse in a number of ways: by granting
or recommending unsafe custody or visitation to batterers; by ignoring or
minimizing battered mothers' reports of partner and/or child abuse, failing
or refusing to investigate such reports, and failing to examine or credit
documented evidence of partner and/or child abuse; and by mishandling
child sexual abuse allegations. 26 The report tells the stories of Karen,
Marsha, Beth, Janice, Jane, Sonia, Gabby, and others to illustrate how the
23. Id. at 11-12.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 15-71. As previously mentioned, the report relies primarily on the narratives of
the forty women interviewed for the project. The report notes, however, "the BMTP [Battered
Mothers Testimony Project] received (and continues to receive) far more requests from battered
women who want to give testimony to the project than we have been able to interview and
therefore include in this report." Id. at 28.
26. Id. at 15.
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courts have failed to protect battered women and children. 7 These
narratives range from quotes to detailed case descriptions relating the
women's experiences with the courts. Karen's story, for example, involves
a lengthy description of how both the judge and the children's attorney
involved in her case denied her requests to curtail her former partner's
visitation, despite evidence that he was abusing alcohol and his new wife
after having been released from jail for assaulting Karen (an assault
witnessed by the older child). 28 The visitation did not change until her ex-
partner was arrested for drunk driving, which prompted the children's
attorney to remark to Karen, "I guess you're happy now., 29 The judge
continued to allow Karen's former partner unsupervised visitation.
30
Karen's story highlights how the court system grants inappropriate
visitation, ignores or minimizes mothers' concerns about their children's
well-being, and fails to credit documented evidence of partner abuse.3"
Sonia begged the judge and guardian ad litem in her case to look at
police reports documenting her ex-partner's violence towards his new
partner.3 2 She remembered,
When we went into court and when Michael was looking for sole
custody, I told [the judge] that I felt that Luke was in a violent
home and was in danger of being harmed, and [the judge]
wouldn't have anything to do with it. He wouldn't listen to me. I
had documents there that I wanted to show him but he refused to
27. Id. at 15-24. In each section of the report, the narrative accounts, which are the
primary source material for the report, are supported by the observations of battered women's
advocates and followed by information derived from interviews with state actors (who were
chosen because two or more women involved in the study had complained about them or
because they were identified as handling partner abuse and child custody issues well, or because
of their specific knowledge of various aspects of the family court system). Id. at 6-7. Not
surprisingly, "the statements that state actors made to us about their beliefs and their approaches
to cases sharply contrasted with what we had learned about how these same individuals had
handled the cases we investigated." Id. at 24.
28. Id. at 15-16.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. Given the criticism that the report was invalid because of its reliance on the
women's subjective retellings of their experiences, it is noteworthy that a representative from
the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project was present at two of Karen's hearings to confirm her
recollections and her impressions. Id.
31. Cassie's example of how court actors minimized reports of partner abuse is more
direct:
In my first meeting with the guardian ad litem, I had told him that there was
a significant history of domestic violence, [that] my ex-partner had been to [a
batterer's intervention program] and that I was disabled as a result of the
abuse, and he told me, 'No one cares about that abuse crap.'
Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 22.
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look at them .... [A] few weeks later, [he] gave Michael sole
legal and physical custody of Luke.33
Their inability to make themselves heard in the court system was
devastating for these mothers. As Marsha explained, "I don't think there is a
worse thing in the world than not being able to protect your children. Like
someone's got my hands tied behind my back and I'm watching them
beaten up, and I can't protect them."34 Using the stories of Karen and her
counterparts, the report argues that the courts are ignoring international
human rights laws and standards requiring them to protect battered women
and their children from further abuse.3 5
Similar stories illustrate the report's other major conclusions. Sandy
described the gender bias she faced when trying to explain her partner's
history of domestic violence against her to a guardian ad litem.36 The
guardian ad litem told Sandy that depending on where her bruises were, he
might deem her the offender, despite documents from the emergency room
detailing her injuries as the result of an assault, and a judge's findings that
Sandy's reports of abuse were credible.37 Lorie explained how state actors'
failure to understand the effects of abuse colored their assessments of the
parties' credibility or stability.
[The guardian ad litem] was saying [that I] was psychologically
unstable and, you know, irrational, emotional, and angry. It's like,
yeah, if you've been through 10 years of what I've been through..
. .You go through hell and try to get out of hell and they punish
you, saying, 'Oh, you cry too much and you're upset, so you
know, the kids are more stable with the father, there's no
emotion.' 38
Lorie further detailed degrading treatment by judges, a custody evaluator,
and a guardian ad litem.39
33. Id.
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 27. The report contends that the courts' failures constitute violations of the right
to be free from violence, torture, and degrading treatment, the right to non-discrimination, and
the government's obligations to exercise due diligence and to act in children's best interests, as
articulated in international treaties. Id. at 15, 27-28. The courts' failures also constitute
violations of United States and Massachusetts law. Id. at 29-31.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. Other forms of bias documented by the report include biased investigations,
evaluations and reports; holding battered mothers to higher standards of parenting and behavior
than fathers; stereotyping women as hysterical and unreasonable; and discrimination on the
basis of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and sexual orientation. Id. at 33-39.
38. Id. at 36.
39. Id. at 46. Lorie described judges who did not let her speak at hearings, did not pay
attention to the testimony of her witnesses, and seemed to be almost sleeping during trial. Id.
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Fran was denied due process at hearings by a judge who refused to allow
her to speak in court and by a probation officer who circumvented court
orders.40 Most of the women described how their batterers were permitted to
continue their abuse using the court system. Sonia's story was typical:
"He's forced me to go back to court endlessly. I can't remember how many
motions we have on our docket. There's got to be 150. Every time I turned
around for years, there was another piece of paper coming in the mail from
the courts., 41 Marsha described how the courts permitted her ex-husband to
deprive her and her children of their economic rights, both through
decisions on child support and by permitting her ex-husband to litigate
baseless custody challenges, leaving Marsha and her children scraping by;
"[a]ll [of] her savings have gone to lawyers. 42 June recalled, "I remember
my son having a 103-degree fever one night and having to get to the
pediatrician, and I didn't have a dime on me 'cause [sic] he wasn't paying
any child support."43 All of the actions described by these women,
according to the report, violated international human rights laws and norms,
Massachusetts standards, and, in some cases, United States law.
44
Given the numerous human rights violations documented by the Battered
Mothers' Testimony Project, the report concludes with a call for
Massachusetts to "take positive steps to remedy the human rights violations
Other denials of due process included pressure to engage in mediation or other forms of
alternative dispute resolution, denial of access to guardian ad litem reports, and ethical issues,
including conflicts of interest and misrepresentations that operated to deny due process. Id. at
50-54.
40. Id. at 50. The probation officer permitted Fran's ex-husband to attend private therapy
with a counselor with no expertise in domestic violence in lieu of participating in batterer's
intervention counseling. Id. General therapy is not an appropriate substitute for a batterer's
intervention program.
41. Id. at 59. In addition to being permitted to file multiple harassing or retaliatory
motions, batterers were allowed to continue their abuse via the court system by making false
allegations against their victims; manipulating the court process to avoid or reduce their child
support; and using parallel actions in courts with different jurisdictions to gain advantage. Id. at
59-62.
42. Id. at 65. Women's and children's economic rights are jeopardized by the cost of
family court litigation, family court actions (like requiring battered women to pay visitation
supervisors or guardian ad litems needed because of their partners' abusive behavior), courts'
willingness to allow batterers to use the courts to financially drain their victims, missing work
or losing jobs as a result of court dates, and hampering their ability to find affordable,
competent representation (needed both to secure their economic rights and to oppose baseless
litigation). Id. at 66-69.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id. at 42-45 (discrimination and bias against women), 48-49 (degrading treatment),
56-58 (denial of due process), 62-63 (allowing batterers to abuse women through family
courts), 70-71 (failure to respect economic rights).
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against battered mothers and their children . . . . Such steps include
increased training for state actors on partner and child abuse, a reform of the
guardian ad litem system, increased economic and legal resources for
battered mothers and their children, and the creation of a system to hold the
family courts accountable for their actions.46 While the authors believe that
their findings are sufficient to create an understanding of the problems faced
by battered mothers and their children in family court litigation, establish
human rights abuses, and propose recommendations for change, the authors
caution that they make "no claim regarding statistical significance, ability to
generalize to a larger population, or the overall extent of the reported
problems either in Massachusetts or elsewhere.
' 47
Battered Mothers Speak Out presents a compelling picture of battered
women and their children denied justice by a court system that ignores their
needs, treats them with disdain, and is generally insensitive to their plight.
Or, Battered Mothers Speak Out presents nothing more than the subjective
perceptions of a disgruntled handful of the thousands of litigants who
engage with the Massachusetts family court system each year. In large part,
the way that the study's findings are interpreted depends on the reader's
willingness to accept the first person narratives of forty individual battered
mothers48 as a sufficient basis for concluding that the Massachusetts family
courts are violating battered mothers' human rights. Even the study itself is
ambivalent on this point, drawing conclusions and making
recommendations pertaining to the Massachusetts family court system as a
whole while warning that the study "does not purport to represent all
battered mothers who have experienced litigation in the Massachusetts
family court system... " and "makes no claim regarding... [the] ability to
generalize to a larger population., 49 Ultimately, the persuasiveness of
Battered Mothers Speak Out is directly tied to its use of the narratives of
battered women, a characteristic cited as a strength by the researchers but
dismissed by state actors. The next section of this article examines the value
placed on narrative research in the social science, human rights, and legal
45. Id. at 74.
46. Id. at 73. As Carrie Cuthbert notes, in many cases, the recommendations do not call for
major change or new laws--only for the application and enforcement of existing laws designed
to protect women and children. E-mail from Carrie Cuthbert, Amherst, Massachusetts, (May 12,
2005) (on file with author).
47. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8.
48. Case reviews were conducted by researchers in about one-quarter of the cases, but
which cases were verified is not clear from the report. See Lombardi, supra note 7.
49. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8. Note, however, that stories were
collected from battered mothers in eleven of Massachusetts' fourteen counties, making it
somewhat easier to make statewide claims. Id. at 6.
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communities. Given the willingness of all of the relevant communities to
credit narrative research, the section concludes that the identity of the
storytellers-battered mothers-rather than the use of the narrative form is
what caused Battered Mothers Speak Out to be largely ignored.
A. The Value of Narrative
Chief Justice Dunphy suggested in his comments at the time of
publication that the methodology employed in Battered Mothers Speak Out
was "flawed,"50 leading him and other state actors to disregard the study's
findings. In the section entitled "Project Documentation and Research
Strategies," the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out describe their
methodology as combining human rights fact-finding with qualitative and
quantitative social science research methods. 51 They address their decision
to rely primarily on narratives in the report, explaining:
The goal of human rights fact-finding is to identify human
rights violations as reported by the victims of the violations and
those who witnessed them ....
As in human rights fact-finding, the driving force behind
qualitative research is the prominence of the voices of the people
under study (project participants). Qualitative research
methodology is especially strong in enabling researchers to
document the lived experiences of individuals and to give
participants the opportunity to describe, in their own words, the
52
social, cultural, and political phenomena affecting them.
Was this decision to rely primarily on narrative methodologically valid
given the current state of thinking in the fields of social science, human
rights documentation, and law? The following sections address this
question.
50. Stewart, supra note 6, at 1.
51. BATrERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 5.
52. Id. at 5. Note that the project also used quantitative research methods to collect
"sociodemographic information and event data about participants' lives during a specified
period of time related to the abusive relationship with an intimate partner and subsequent
litigation in the family courts." Id.
720 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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III. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE INVESTIGATION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH
A. The False Dichotomy
"Valid" social science research is frequently equated with "quantitative"
research-at the most basic level, research that relies on numbers, rather
than words (the province of qualitative research).53 While quantitative
research was the "dominant" approach of social scientists in the United
States for many years, "since the 1960s there has been a revival in the
fortunes of qualitative types of research in these disciplines, to the point
where their legitimacy is widely accepted. 5 4 Nonetheless, social scientists
continue to battle the perception that qualitative research is not as
scientifically rigorous or objective as quantitative, which has implications
for the use of such research in developing social policy.55
To flesh out the differences between the two a little more fully,
quantitative research "implies the application of a measurement or
numerical approach to the nature of the issue under scrutiny as well as to
the gathering and analysis of data," while qualitative research:
[R~elies upon case studies or evidence gleaned from individuals or
particular situations . . . [and] explores the processes behind
observed associations between factors, charts individual outcomes
and explores the meanings and contexts of individuals' behaviour.
Thus, quantitative and qualitative approaches differ not only in the
53. Martyn Hammersley, Deconstructing the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide, in MIXING
METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 39, 41 (Julia Brannen ed., 1992).
Hammersley suggests that the real issue between the two schools of thought is precision, with
quantitative researchers arguing that sufficient precision can be achieved only through
quantification. Id. at 42. Hammersley cautions, however, that precision can be expressed in
ways other than numerically, and that accuracy is more important than precision, particularly
when numbers are used to "imply a greater degree of precision than their likely accuracy
warrants." Id.
54. Id. at 40.
55. Roger Bullock et al., The Relationships Between Quantitative and Qualitative
Approaches in Social Policy Research, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE
RESEARCH, supra note 53, at 81, 89; see also Julia Brannen, Combining Qualitative and
Quantitative Approaches: An Overview, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 53, at 3, 18; Virginia L. Olesen, Feminisms and
Qualitative Research At and Into the Millenium, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 215,
217 (Norman K. Denzin & Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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methods employed but also in the perception of the problem and
the type of data they produce.56
Quantitative research provides social scientists with "authoritative
survey data... assess[ing] the incidence, epidemiology and boundaries of
problems of the situation under scrutiny."57 Qualitative research, in contrast,
provides "greater understanding of the meaning and context of behaviours
and the processes that take place within observed patterns of interrelated
factors" and enables researchers to examine the perceptions different
participants have of the same situation.58
Although researchers stress that best practice frequently requires that
both quantitative and qualitative methods be used to study a problem,5 9 the
type of problem being studied generally dictates which type of research
strategy should take the lead in a given project. For example, in a study of
parents caring for young adults with mental handicaps and behavior
problems, the researcher explains, "[t]he problem area itself was socially
defined and therefore might be differently constructed by different actors,
and its more severe manifestations were known to be likely to be distressing
to those involved. This suggested that there would be value in a qualitative
approach., 60 Because it "blurs easily into advocacy and efforts to find
solutions to problems, 6 ' qualitative research is also well-suited to address
"flaws and faults in society and in so doing promote actions that eliminate
problems."62
B. Narrative Research as a Subset of Qualitative Research
Narrative research, like the type used by Battered Mothers Speak Out, is
one form of qualitative research, an approach that often seems "heretical to
56. Bullock et al., supra note 55, at 85; see also Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich, A
Framework for Narrative Research Proposals in Psychology, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE
TEACHING AND LEARNING OF NARRATIVE RESEARCH 259, 260 (Ruthellen Josselson, Amia
Lieblich & Dan P. McAdams eds., 2003) [hereinafter UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL]; HERBERT J.
RUBIN & IRENE S. RUBIN, QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWING: THE ART OF HEARING DATA 32-34
(1995) (describing the "positivist" or quantitative model of research).
57. Bullock et al., supra note 55, at 85.
58. Id. at 86.
59. See, e.g., id. at 86-87.
60. Hazel Qureshi, Integrating Methods in Applied Research in Social Policy: A Case
Study of Careers, in MIXING METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH, supra
note 53, at 101, 120. The similarities between the factors used to determine that qualitative
research was appropriate in this case and the challenges posed by research on battered mothers
will be examined in detail later. See infra Part III.C.
61. RUBIN &RUBIN, supra note 56, at 13.
62. Id. at 35.
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those reared in a positivistic, scientistic atmosphere. 63  Narrative
researchers contend that experiences have little value when left unconnected
to the stories told by the participants because stories are the means by which
we understand and relate those experiences.' Narrative research
distinguishes itself both from the methods and the goals of quantitative
research by stressing an examination of a subject's life experiences and the
connection of those experiences to historical, social, and cultural contexts.65
Narrative analysis, then, has two goals: to understand how people and/or
groups make sense of their experiences and to describe the social worlds
they inhabit and social resources "they draw on, resist, and transform as
they tell their stories. 6 6 Narratives are not simply offered in a vacuum, but
rather used to construct theory.67
Narrative researchers reject the assertion that neutrality is either
desirable or achievable in social science research.68 While students are
trained to think of research in terms of "objectivity" and "truth," lacking in
"personal connection and passion," narrative researchers claim that research
is always affected by the researcher's "goals, plans, beliefs, and practices. 69
63. Ruthellen Josselson et al., Introduction to UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 56, at
3, 4. As June Price notes, however, "[t]he very act of posing a research question will influence
and shape the answer," regardless of whether the method used to answer the question is
quantitative or qualitative. June Price, In Acknowledgment: A Review and Critique of
Qualitative Research Texts, in MAKING MEANING OF NARRATIVES 1, 2 (Ruthellen Josselson &
Amia Lieblich eds., 1999).
64. Guy A.M. Widdershoven, The Story of Life: Hermenuetic Perspectives on the
Relationship Between Narrative and Life History, in THE NARRATIVE STUDY OF LIVES 1, 7
(Ruthellen Josselson & Amia Lieblich eds., 1993).
65. Colette Daiute & Michelle Fine, Researchers as Protagonists in Teaching and
Learning Qualitative Research, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 56, at 62-63. The
editors of UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL: THE TEACHING AND LEARNING OF NARRATIVE RESEARCH
describe the differences:
In considering people as constructors of their experience, such research
takes a giant step away from parsing human experience into predefined
'variables' and requires of the researcher an equally major shift in
perspective and approach. Rather than forming hypotheses, the researcher
frames questions for exploration; in place of measurement are the challenges
of deeply listening to others; and instead of statistics are the ambiguities of
thoughtful analysis of texts.
Josselson et al., supra note 63, at 3.
66. Susan E. Chase, Learning to Listen: Narrative Principles in a Qualitative Research
Methods Course, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 56, at 79-81.
67. See Blythe McVicker Clinchy, An Epistemological Approach to the Teaching of
Narrative Research, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 56, at 29, 46.
68. See Daiute & Fine, supra note 65, at 64-65.
69. Id. at 64. They explain that "social research is always constructed and contingent, that
no construct or life or community preexists language or social relations; that research is about
evidence, framing, and reframing." Id. at 65.
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The relationships developed between subjects and researchers using
narrative research methodology help those researchers to better understand
their own "biases, assumptions, and social reactions,"7 allowing narrative
researchers to be more honest about the operation of these factors on their
research than quantitative researchers, who maintain (erroneously,
according to narrative researchers) that their numerical methods protect
them from the influence of such factors. In fact, some narrative researchers
maintain that "[n]eutrality is probably not a legitimate goal in qualitative
research," both because it is impossible to achieve and because it impedes
the development of the empathetic connection between researcher and
subject needed to elicit personal stories and probe for details.71 Despite
these connections, however, narrative researchers argue that their results
can be as easily generalized as those attained in quantitative research-more
so, if the questions being asked require more than simple "yes or no,
approve or disapprove" responses.72
C. Battered Mothers Speak Out in the Context of Social Science
Research
The main criticism leveled against Battered Mothers Speak Out involves
its use of the narratives of battered women to support its assertion that these
women's human rights were violated.73 The use of such narratives is
entirely appropriate in social science research, particularly when, as in
Battered Mothers Speak Out, those narratives are supported by other kinds
of information, including interviews and surveys of other actors within the
system, case reviews, and external documentation of abuse.74 The procedure
70. Annie G. Rogers, Qualitative Research in Psychology: Teaching an Interpretive
Process, in UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL, supra note 56, at 49, 55.
71. RUBIN & RUBIN, supra note 56, at 13. The authors caution, however, that balance is
necessary; "too much sympathy can... be blinding." Id.
72. Id. at 72-73. Narrative researchers have questioned whether the use of such standards
is appropriate for evaluating their work. Traditionally, "reliability, validity, objectivity, and
replicability" were considered the prime criteria for evaluating research. AMIA LIEBLICH ET AL.,
NARRATIVE RESEARCH: READING, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 171 (1998). Narrative
researchers have suggested, however, that these criteria are inappropriate for evaluating their
work, and in fact, are contradictory to the narrative approach. Id. They suggest, instead, that the
following criteria be used to evaluate their research: width (comprehensiveness of the evidence);
coherence (how the parts create a complete and meaningful picture); insightfulness (innovation
or originality in presentation and analysis); and parsimony (providing analysis based on a small
number of concepts). Id. at 173.
73. Wen, supra note 7, at B2.
74. Sixteen state actors, including seven family court judges and four guardians ad litem
were interviewed. Most of these state actors were contacted because of complaints against them.
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 7-8. Thirty-one advocates for battered
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followed by the interviewers conformed to social science research
principles as well; trained interviewers used a semi-structured instrument to
conduct the interviews, which were later transcribed and analyzed using
practices accepted in the field."
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out acknowledge limitations of
their research. As the authors note in a companion study,
It is important that these data be recognized as documentation
of a set of issues based on reports of affected individuals (i.e.
battered women referred to the project based on their
dissatisfaction with family court outcomes or processes) rather
than an attempt at definitive research into the prevalence and
nature of the types of cases discussed.76
In fact, the authors suggest, Battered Mothers Speak Out provides a starting
point for future quantitative research into the scope of the problems it
identifies, the long-term implications of custody and visitation decisions on
children in cases involving domestic violence, and the utility of the various
solutions for improving the court suggested by the report.77
women and children completed surveys consisting of nineteen open-ended questions. Id. at 6-7.
As previously noted, case reviews were conducted in about one quarter of the battered mothers'
cases to verify their claims. Wen, supra note 7, at B2. All of the participants had some form of
documentation of the violence they had experienced. Jay G. Silverman, Cynthia M. Mesh,
Carrie V. Cuthbert, Kim Slote & Lundy Bancroft, Child Custody Determinations in Cases
Involving Intimate Partner Violence: A Human Rights Analysis, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 951,
952 (2004).
75. Interview transcripts were read initially to identify emerging themes. Coding schema
were then developed to define and identify particular problems faced by participants; schema
were modified to reflect new understanding of emerging patterns throughout the coding process.
Interrater reliability was verified through secondary review of all coded passages. Coded data
were managed with a customized relational Microsoft Access 2000 database and the
"[firequency of defined problems across transcripts was assessed, and human rights violations
implicated were identified." Silverman et al., supra note 74, at 952; see also BATrERED
MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8. The project staff included social science researchers as
well as lawyers and experts on domestic violence. Telephone Interview with Kim Slote, supra
note 10.
76. Silverman et al., supra note 74, at 956. In fact, while in the footnotes the report
quantifies the number of women reporting a particular problem, it does not use those "statistics"
to argue that any percentage of the family court population is experiencing similar problems.
BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8.
77. See Silverman et al., supra note 74, at 956. Using qualitative evidence to produce
hypotheses that can be tested by using quantitative methods, as suggested by the authors, is an
accepted social science research practice. Bullock et al., supra note 55, at 87. The Boston Globe
called for such a review after hearing only a portion of the evidence amassed by the researchers.
Witnesses to Abuse, supra note 4, at A18 ("A full report on this project will be issued in
October. But state officials should act now. A systematic review of court cases involving
domestic violence and custody could reveal ways to improve policies and procedures.").
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One particularly pointed criticism that deserves greater attention is the
argument that the failure to incorporate competing narratives (those of the
alleged perpetrators, lawyers, judges and/or guardians ad litem involved in
the cases of the women interviewed) renders the women's stories
unbelievable."8 While the request for this information seems reasonable on
its face, in fact it creates a circular argument through which the battered
women's narratives are silenced. The critics seek external validation of the
battered women's claims from the very persons identified as having
committed the abuse,79 having been biased, or having discounted evidence
of domestic violence presented to them-all of whom bring their own
experiences, perspectives and biases to the stories they tell. When,
predictably, the actors in question deny these claims, the critics at best will
throw up their hands and say, "[t]he evidence is in equipoise," and at worst,
will use these stories to drown out those told by battered women-the very
phenomenon the mothers describe in the report.80 While some of the
battered mothers' claims are externally verifiable using means other than
alternate narratives-for example, by quantifying the frequency with which
custody is awarded to those alleged or found to have committed domestic
violence or inappropriate referrals to mediation are made-others are about
the process itself and cannot be verified using case reviews or other external
measures. This is particularly true in those cases where those with whom
you would check such claims have their own reasons for insisting that the
system is fair.81 No record would exist, for example, of Cassie
8 2 or Lorie's 83
out-of-court conversations with the guardians ad litem representing their
children, and the guardians ad litem are unlikely to verify claims that cast
them in an unprofessional light.
Moreover, asking for external validation of these types of unverifiable
claims misses the point of the report. The relevant inquiry here is not how
many battered mothers received poor treatment on a number of dimensions
78. See Wen, supra note 7, at B2.
79. Note, too, that the purpose of the project was not to prove whether the women were
battered or not, but to gauge their treatment by the courts and other state actors when they
claimed that they had been battered. As the authors note, "[blecause the main focus of this work
was accountability of the government rather than of abusive partners, documentation and
descriptions of abuse suffered by participating women and their children provide a context for
examining actions or inactions of family court state actors as possible human rights violations..
." Silverman et al., supra note 74, at 952.
80. See BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 19-20.
81. As Anthony Amsterdam explains, "I suppose each one of us sees pretty much what his
or her own head is screwed on to see ..... Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories
About Them, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 9, 19 (1994).
82. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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at the hands of state actors. Instead, the question being asked is how and
why battered mothers perceived that they were being mistreated by the
family court system.8 4 Only the narratives of the battered mothers involved
with the system can answer that question.85
The battered mothers' narratives are used to understand their individual
stories as well as to examine the context in which those stories are being
told-the family court system.86 Qualitative research generally, and
narrative research specifically, are accepted and acceptable methods of
exploring, reporting, contextualizing and generalizing the experiences of
discrete populations,87 like the women studied in Battered Mothers Speak
Out. The methodology used by the project allows for generalization, but the
project makes no claims of quantitative statistical significance, and in fact,
uses the narratives generated to suggest both policy changes and future
research.88
IV. NARRATIVE EVIDENCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS
A. Narratives and Human Rights Investigations
Human rights investigations have long been used throughout the world to
document state abuses of power resulting in violations of international law.
The use of human rights investigation is a less common method of
documenting domestic human rights violations, however. 89 As Justice
Dunphy opined, human rights investigations "may work well for systems in
Third World countries, but not for a court in the United States." 90 But a
84. Ensuring that the public perceives the court system as fair should be a major concern
for the court. See Robert J. Aalberts, Thomas Boyt & Lorne H. Seidman, Public Defender's
Conundrum: Signaling Professionalism and Quality in the Absence of Price, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 525, 527 (2002) (arguing that "[i]f the American people lose confidence in the court
system, its role in protecting legal rights and creating meaningful and effective public policy
could be greatly undermined.").
85. See BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 5.
86. See id.
87. See LIEBLICH ET AL., supra note 72, at 45.
88. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 8.
89. Some have argued that the reluctance to employ these techniques is related to "a
deliberate, long-standing effort by the federal government to deny the legitimacy of human
rights and, in particular, their application to situations internal to the United States." EUNICE
CHO ET AL, SOMETHING INSIDE So STRONG: A RESOURCE GUIDE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 6 (2002).
90. Lombardi, supra note 7, at 6. Despite Justice Dunphy's skepticism, the Massachusetts
House recently held hearings on a bill which would create a special commission "to investigate
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growing number of organizations, particularly those working on behalf of
women in the United States, are using international human rights norms to
analyze the actions of domestic institutions.9 The Ford Foundation report
Something Inside So Strong provides several justifications for the use of
domestic human rights documentation:
Documenting human rights violations can be a powerful way
to make the abuses faced by your community visible and credible,
and can help to expose and challenge the perpetrators of the abuse.
By collecting information about human rights violations in your
community, it is possible to introduce a human rights perspective
to your work, while empowering community members to speak for
themselves in confronting human rights abuses. Documentation of
abuse also provides a quantifiable, yet human face to a situation,
providing a tool for further action.92
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out echoed these themes in an
article written after the report was released. The authors explained, "[t]he
human rights framework helped us to demonstrate the linkages and overlap
between the violations, the economic issues battered mothers face after
separation, and the multiple forms of discrimination many battered women
experience. ' 93 Additionally, the human rights framework helped battered
women see their own experiences in a broader rights-based context and
highlighted the severity of the abuses they alleged.
94
Collecting the stories of those alleging human rights abuses is a
cornerstone of this work. "It is through individual complaints that human
rights are given concrete meaning .... When applied to a person's real-life
situation, the standards contained in international human rights treaties find
the integration of international human rights standards into Massachusetts state law and
policies." See H.B. 706, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005).
91. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Transnational Law as a Domestic Resource: Thoughts on
the Case of Women's Rights, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689, 689 (2004) ("International human rights
treaties, human rights documents, and international and comparative legal norms are
increasingly viewed as relevant sources of law for United States domestic lawmaking in a wide
range of fields, including the death penalty, affirmative action and women's rights.") See
generally MOLLY BEUTZ ET. AL, THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AGAINST REFUGEE AND IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN THE MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL METROPOLITAN
AREA: A HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2004); CHO ET AL, supra note 89, at 40; Shruti Rana,
Restricting the Rights of Poor Mothers: An International Human Rights Critique of
"Workfare," 33 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 393 (2000).
92. CHO ET AL., supra note 89, at 75; see also JULIE MERTUS ET AL., WOMEN'S HUMAN
RIGHTS STEP BY STEP 111 (Margaret A. Schuler & Dorothy Q. Thomas eds., 1997) (offering
rationales for creating "national human rights systems").
93. Cuthbert, supra note 8, at 13.
94. Id.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
TELLING STORIES, SAVING LIVES
their most direct application." 95 The narratives of victims are an essential,
perhaps the most important, component of a human rights investigation. 96
As the authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out note:
[Hiuman rights documentation's central source of information
is first-hand testimonies of the survivors of such violations.
Typically, these are the very voices that are muted or silenced by
the government and society. In human rights documentation,
survivor accounts are corroborated by witnesses, fact-checking,
secondary research, and interviews with state actors. Still,
survivors' voices remain paramount to the process of
investigation.97
Human rights organizations, from non-governmental organizations like
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, collect the stories of individuals in
order to document claims of human rights abuses throughout the world.
Investigations into human rights claims of battered refugee and immigrant
women in Minneapolis/St. Paul,98 women raped during the war in the
former Yugoslavia,99 Afghani women,1w Nigerian victims of war crimes01
and countless others have been supported by the testimony of the affected
individuals. The narratives contained in Battered Mothers Speak Out fall
squarely within this tradition.
How should such narratives be compiled? In Women's Human Rights
Step by Step, Margaret Schuler and Dorothy Thomas provide a blueprint for
conducting a human rights investigation. °2 They separate the process into
three steps: preparation, fieldwork/investigation, and follow-up and
analysis.0 3 In their discussion of fieldwork/investigations, Schuler and
Thomas explain that while "[t]he type of evidence to be gathered depends
95. OFFICE FOR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET No. 7IREV.1,
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs7.htm.
96. MERTUS ET AL., supra note 92, at 146.
97. KIM SLOTE ET AL., BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: PARTICIPATORY HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCUMENTATION AS A MODEL FOR RESEARCH AND ACTIVISM IN THE U.S. 13-14 (unpublished
report on file with author).
98. See generally BEUTZETAL., supra note 91.
99. See generally Women in the Law Project, International Human Rights Law Group, No
Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 89 (1994).
100. See generally Sonali Kolhatkar, The Impact of U.S. Intervention on Afghan Women's
Rights, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 12 (2002).
101. Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes Towards a
More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89 (2003).
102. MERTUS ET AL., supra note 92.
103. See MERTUS ET AL., supra note 92, at 140-54.
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on the investigation's objectives," collecting narratives is crucial.' °4 They
state, "[w]hatever the investigation's objective, the testimony of the victims
of the abuse is very important." 5 Such testimony should be detailed and
can be supplemented by the testimony of others with first-hand knowledge
of the abuse being studied as well as secondary information from other
sources. 10 6 Evidence should be collected from all sides to "assure[] balance
and impartiality and provide[] a more thorough representation of what
occurred. ' .0 7 Because "[t]he value of the evidence depends on its accuracy,
reliability, and specificity," investigators should also seek to corroborate
what they have learned through direct testimony; methods of corroboration
include interviewing other witnesses or collecting similar complaints from
other sources.108
B. Battered Mothers Speak Out as Human Rights Investigation
While critics of Battered Mothers Speak Out doubt whether the use of
human rights investigation was an appropriate framework for addressing a
domestic issue, no one has questioned whether the authors of the study
followed an established process for collecting narratives in such an
investigation. The human rights community generally seems to agree that
collecting the stories of victims is an acceptable, even essential, component
of building a human rights documentation case; the value of those narratives
as justification for policy change does not seem to spark the same academic
debates as in the social science and legal worlds.0 9 The process for
collecting such narratives seems fairly uncontroversial as well; in fact, little
has been written about how human rights documentation should be
conducted (as opposed to why).' 1 0
The authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out adhered to the general
principles set forth by Schuler and Thomas in Women's Human Rights Step
by Step. They collected the stories of victims and made those stories the
104. Id. at 146.
105. Id. (alterations in original).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 147.
108. Id.
109. International human rights lawyers I contacted saw the collection of victim stories as
such a given in human rights investigations that they had not sought and could not come up with
protocols for engaging in such work. E-mail from Sarah Paoletti, Practitioner-In-Residence,
American University, Washington College of Law (Aug. 4, 2004) (on file with author). Kim
Slote, one of the authors of the study, verified that they had a very difficult time finding such
materials. E-mail from Kim Slote, Co-Founder and Former Co-Director, Women's Rights
Network and the Battered Mother's Testimony Project (May 12, 2005) (on file with author).
110. See E-mail from Kim Slote, supra note 109.
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focal point of their investigation.'' They supplemented the stories with
accounts of other first hand witnesses-advocates for battered women and
their children." 2 Researchers also interviewed state actors, many of whom
disagreed with the victims about the way in which the Massachusetts family
courts operated; 1 3 including these perspectives allowed researchers to
provide a more balanced account. Researchers sought to corroborate the
victims' stories through the use of secondary documentation." 1
4
The Battered Mothers' Testimony Project has been recognized as a
model for conducting domestic human rights investigations. In its
publication Something Inside So Strong: A Resource Guide on Human
Rights in the United States, the Ford Foundation calls the Project a "case in
point" for conducting human rights documentation in the United States." 5
C. Narratives and the Law
1. The Role of Narratives in Legal Scholarship
While lawyers are, fundamentally, storytellers, 1 6 until recently legal
scholarship did not embrace the use of narratives.'17 But as scholars
examining issues of race," 8 gender,1 9 poverty, 20 and sexual orientation 2 '
111. See BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 5.
112. SLOTEETAL., supra note 97, at 16.
113. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 24.
114. Lombardi, supra note 7.
115. CHO ET AL., supra note 89, at 49. Criticism from the human rights community centered
not on the project's process, but on its aggressive stance. Mindy Roseman questioned whether
the project would have done more good if it had "constructively engage[d]" the courts "rather
than confront[ing] them." Mindy Roseman, Beyond Name and Blame, 2 HUM. RTs. DIALOGUE
10, 5 (Fall 2003), available at http://www.cceia.org/viewMedia.php/prmTemplateID/8/prm
ID/1110.
116. See John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What Is a True
Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 87-88
(1999).
117. As Binny Miller notes, Karl Llewellyn was emphasizing the importance of stories in
his work in 1941. Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of
Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2000). Miller distinguishes stories from narratives,
however, explaining, "[a] story describes an account of a happening, while a narrative denotes a
broader theme or meaning. Stories are the raw material of personal experience; narratives are a
construction from those stories." Id.
118. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE
OF RACISM (1992); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
119. See generally Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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have increasingly come to rely on their own stories, as well as the stories of
clients and others, in their scholarship, a conversation about the worth of
narrative legal scholarship has emerged.
Narratives in legal scholarship describe the experience of individuals and
groups with the legal system and provide context for these experiences.'22
Using narratives in legal scholarship is appealing, in part, because it mirrors
what lawyers do. 123 Proponents of narrative legal scholarship also stress
how narratives bring the voices of those traditionally deprived of power
within the legal system to the forefront. 124 Arguing that while it may appear
neutral, the law itself is a story, structured around narratives developed by
the powerful, proponents of narrative theory offer alternative narratives to
illustrate the ways that the law excludes these voices and advocate for the
need to reform the law to address "outsider" voices. 125 Narratives help to
create common ground, allowing individuals to understand and empathize
with the experiences of individuals and groups who are, or seem to be,
different. 126 Narratives can bridge the gap between the abstractions of the
law and the individual experiences of the humans involved in legal
proceedings. 127 As in social science, narratives permit feminist scholars to
challenge "the jurisprudential insistence on a fictional abstract discourse of
120. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
121. See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607
(1994); Timothy E. Lin, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of
Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739 (1999).
122. Mitchell, supra note 116, at 88-89.
123. "In other comers of the legal world, we find tasks that immerse lawyers in the
concrete, require us to be sensitive to the particularities of voice, demand that we find meaning
in the nonlinear or ambiguous-require that we exercise, in short, many of the same skills
necessary to comprehend legal narratives." Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79
CAL. L. REV. 971, 1043 (1991).
124. See generally id. (examining the use of narratives in feminist legal scholarship); Dana
Raigrodski, Breaking Out of "Custody": A Feminist Voice in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1301, 1310-11 (1999).
125. Abrams, supra note 123, at 984; Mitchell, supra note 116, at 96-97. Dana Raigrodski,
looking at this issue from the feminist perspective, notes, "[t]o the extent that personal
experiences may differ according to gender, these different 'women's' experiences are often not
accounted for within prevailing legal doctrines and discourses." Raigrodski, supra note 124, at
1306.
126. See Mitchell, supra note 116, at 95-96; Murphy, supra note 9, at 1253. But see Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. REV. 807, 848-49 (1993) (arguing that people are unlikely to learn from stories that do
not resonate with their own experiences).
127. See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words,
Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2105 (1989); Elizabeth J. Samuels, Stories Out of
School: Teaching the Case of Brown v. Voss, 16 CARDOzO L. REV. 1445, 1446-48 (1995).
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objectivity and reasonableness" resulting from the imposition of these
"masculine values as the norm."'' 28 Even critics of the use of narrative agree
that narratives featuring these "stories from the bottom" have an important
role to play in legal scholarship.
129
2. Evaluating Legal Narratives
Critics of narrative scholarship have noted a number of concerns about
this type of work: that the stories told by narrative scholars lack normative
legal content; are not persuasive; are not trustworthy; are not typical; and
curtail further discussion.13 ° Even if the narratives are sufficiently "valid,"
an additional concern arises about the quality of the scholarship itself.
131
Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn. 132
Some critics contend that narratives lack normative legal content. This
argument is generally framed in one of two ways: either the narrative fails
to "shed[] . . . even descriptive light on a particular legal problem" or
implicate a legal rule or the narrative does not "contribute to the
formulation of a legal response" to the legal issue or problem identified in
the narrative.'33 This concern about normative legal content is tied to the
question of whether the narrative is (or can be) sufficiently persuasive to
justify challenging or changing existing norms.3 The persuasiveness of a
128. Raigrodski, supra note 124, at 1324. Raigrodski argues further that employing
narratives in judicial decision-making could create more just results, affirm the justice of the
law for the public, and decrease stereotypical thinking about women. Id. at 1326-27.
129. Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 827-30.
130. Abrams, supra note 123, at 978-980.
131. Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 831.
132. The bulk of the critique of narrative legal scholarship discussed in this section comes
from the Farber and Sherry piece Telling Stories Out of School. See Farber & Sherry, supra note
126. Defenders of narrative scholarship have questioned the legitimacy of the standards
articulated by Farber and Sherry, and made powerful arguments that narrative scholars need not
have their scholarship judged by those standards. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories,
67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to
Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of
Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory
in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994); see also Arthur Austin, Evaluating
Storytelling as a Type of Nontraditional Scholarship, 74 NEB. L. REV. 479 (1995) (offering an
alternative set of criteria for assessing the worth of narrative scholarship). While I agree with
many of the arguments made in response to Farber and Sherry's article, I have chosen to use
their standards as the benchmark for measuring narrative scholarship precisely because they are
the harshest critics; showing that BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT addresses their concerns
bolsters the argument that gender bias, not bad scholarship, is the reason for the report's
rejection. See BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1.
133. Abrams, supra note 123, at 978.
134. Id.
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narrative is, in turn, affected by whether the narrative is perceived as true, as
typical, and whether the narrative can create understanding in a listener who
has not shared the experience.'35
For Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, discovering and communicating
"truths about the legal system" is the function of legal scholarship. 136 While
narratives are an integral part of the legal system, critics note that the
"truth" derived from competing narratives is generally established through
the adversarial process. 137 Without a judicial declaration of "truth," critics
argue, the credibility of the narrative must be accepted on faith, a difficult
task for readers whose experiences do not resonate with those described by
the author.'38 A skeptical reader's credulity may be further tested by the
emotional content of some narratives; the discomfort of sharing personal
revelations may lead readers "to discount, discredit, or otherwise distance
themselves from such discussions."' 3 9 Moreover, critics argue that relying
on readers to determine whether a story is truthful or not is problematic,
given that social science research indicates that humans are poor judges of
truthfulness. '40
Even if a narrative is truthful, the critics contend, it should not serve as
the basis for policy change unless it is also typical. The argument is that one
person's experience should not serve as the basis for change that affects
many others, unless the experience related in the narrative is common to a
135. Id. at 979-80.
136. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dmitri Yurasov: Further
Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647, 648 (1994).
137. Abrams, supra note 123. See Austin, supra note 132, at 525 ("[Albsent a confession or
a trial, it is impossible to determine truthfulness.").
138. Abrams, supra note 123, at 978-80. As Farber and Sherry note, however, "[o]ne of the
staples of feminist literature is that women's assertions are treated as presumptively unreliable
and lacking in credibility." Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 834. Farber and Sherry discount
this notion, arguing, "[i]t would be disastrous to reinforce the idea that women.., do not adhere
to the same standards of 'truthfulness' as white men." Id. Farber and Sherry misstate the
feminist position, however. The argument is not that women do not adhere to the same
standards of truthfulness, but that despite adhering to those standards, women are nonetheless
viewed as not being as truthful or credible. See infra Part V.
139. Abrams, supra note 123, at 979.
140. Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 837. Nonetheless, they state, "[w]e do not mean to
assert that legal scholars should consider only evidence meeting formal social science
standards." Id. at 838. Abrams counters that argument by noting that in various other
disciplines-like, as discussed earlier, social science-the notion that an objective truth exists is
being challenged. In the law, as in social science, "the problems scholars choose to study and
the methods by which they investigate and assess claims.., are shaped by language, personal
or cultural experience, historical context, or intellectual tradition." Abrams, supra note 123, at
1014. While objectivity may remain the "dominant paradigm," it is no longer the only means by
which claims can be supported. Id. at 1015.
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significant number of others.141 Determining typicality can be as challenging
as ascertaining truth; "people are too quick to assume the presence of a
pattern from a small number of cases."'
' 42
Finally, narrative scholarship must be good scholarship. Simply telling
an evocative story is insufficient to constitute quality legal scholarship. As
with social science research, that story must be tied to some kind of analysis
to assure the reader both that the story is "credible and representative" and
to place the story in the context of the wider legal debate with which the
story is concerned. 143 As Farber and Sherry explain, "[a] legal story without
analysis is much like a judicial opinion with 'Findings of Fact' but no
'Conclusions of Law."' 44
3. Battered Mothers Speak Out as Legal Narrative
Determining whether Battered Mothers Speak Out constitutes sound
legal scholarship according to the standards set forth by critics of narrative
legal scholarship depends on the answers to the questions posed above. Do
the narratives have normative legal content? Are they persuasive?
Trustworthy? Typical? Analytical? Each of these questions is considered
below.
Normative legal content refers both to the narrative's ability to highlight
a legal problem and to suggest a legal solution to that problem. Certainly
Battered Mothers Speak Out meets both of those objectives. The report
highlights the range of negative experiences battered mothers had with the
family courts of Massachusetts145 and suggests ways that family court
personnel, judges, probation officers, guardians ad litem and others with
roles in the functioning of the family court could address these problems. 1
46
While the changes recommended relate to process, rather than doctrine, they
nonetheless require a legal system response and therefore have normative
legal content.147
141. Abrams, supra note 123, at 980; Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 838-39.
142. Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 839.
143. Id. at 852-54.
144. Id. at 854.
145. See generally BATrERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1.
146. Recommendations were made for the courts, legislature, non-governmental
organizations and the legal profession and included reforming the guardian ad litem system;
training for family court personnel; practice standards for judges and probate probation officers;
and administrative changes to enhance accountability of family court system actors. BATrERED
MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 74-83.
147. Doctrinal changes are largely unnecessary because adequate statutory and case law
exists to protect battered mothers in Massachusetts, if that law is followed. The family court
system's failure to comply with existing state law is a mainstay of the report. Id. at 14.
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Are the narratives contained in Battered Mothers Speak Out persuasive
and trustworthy? These are harder questions to answer, partly because few
have weighed in on these questions, and partly because answering those
questions requires deciding whose observations to accept. The narratives
seemed to resonate with the Boston Globe, 48 as well as with battered
women's advocates throughout the country; the project has been or is being
replicated in a number of other states. 49 Battered mothers identified with
the stories, calling lead author Carrie Cuthbert to tell her, "[t]his is my
story. Your project made me feel like I'm not alone."' 5° Fathers' rights
groups, however, disagreed, describing the report as "one-sided." 5 ' The
court, too, tacitly challenged the veracity of the reports by suggesting the
need for external validation of the claims.'52 Very little other documentation
sharing perceptions of the narratives exists. 5 3 It is likely that most of the
readers of the report were people with a stake in the debate, and their views
are represented in the comments above.
Kathryn Abrams argues that individuals can determine the validity of
narratives based on a number of factors:
[I]f I read the particularized accounts of each, and if I find that
they have an acceptable degree of internal consistency, create a
plausible account of a particular set of events, and do not seem
suspicious in tone, I begin to have a belief that is not based on my
own experiences ....
I believe [narratives], in other words, in the same way and for
many of the same reasons that I would believe an effective witness
in the courtroom.
154
But Farber and Sherry contend that those standards (although largely the
same as those relied upon by the Supreme Court) are not themselves
trustworthy enough to employ.' 5
148. See Witnesses to Abuse, supra note 4 and text accompanying note.
149. Silverman et al., supra note 74, at 955.
150. WELLESLEY CENTERS FOR WOMEN, BATTERED MOTHERS FIGHT TO SURVIVE THE FAMILY
COURT SYSTEM: RESEARCH AND ACTION REPORT (Fall/winter 2003), http://www.
wcwonline.org/o-rr25- lb.html.
151. Wen, supra note 7, at B2.
152. Id.
153. In a heated listserv debate on the American Bar Association Center on Children and
the Law's Child-DV listserv, battered women's advocates, custody evaluators, and others
debated the merits of the report. While some of the debate had to do with these questions, the
debate largely centered on the validity of the report as social science research. E-mails from
Listerv on file with author.
154. Abrams, supra note 123, at 1002.
155. Farber & Sherry, supra note 126, at 836-37.
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Ultimately, the problem with using the standards of persuasiveness and
trustworthiness to evaluate narrative legal scholarship is that they are
largely unattainable. The different life experiences, preferences, and biases
that color narratives also color responses to narratives. As a result, few
narratives will create the kind of consensus around persuasiveness and
trustworthiness that critics of narrative scholarship would require, especially
when those narratives involve subjects as emotional and hotly contested as
domestic violence and child custody. It seems unreasonable, then, to judge
the validity of the narratives found in Battered Mothers Speak Out by these
standards.
Are these narratives typical? Farber and Sherry stress that "typicality is
unrelated to any commitment to 'objectivity' as a philosophical position.
Instead, we are merely asking, 'If we checked with more people in the same
situation, how many of them would tell similar stories?' 15 6 The difficulty
with this standard is defining the phrase "people in the same situation." The
responses from other battered mothers and advocates for battered women
strongly suggest that these narratives are typical, so long as "other people in
the same situation" is defined as "other battered mothers in the family court
system." If the definition is "other mothers in the family court system" or
"other individuals in the family court system," the answers would obviously
be very different. Again, the subjectivity of the inquiry makes determining
whether the standard has been attained almost impossible.
Battered Mothers Speak Out does contain the kind of analysis Farber and
Sherry deem necessary for narrative scholarship to be "good" scholarship.
The report ties the issues raised by the battered mothers in their narratives to
provisions in international, federal, and state law and argues that state actors
have violated these international norms, United States laws, and
Massachusetts laws in the cases of these forty women. Whether the reader
agrees with the argument is not dispositive under Farber and Sherry's
schema; the report provides the type of rigorous legal analysis-the
conclusions of law to accompany the findings of fact-required for quality
narrative legal scholarship.
Battered Mothers Speak Out falls squarely within the tradition of using
narratives to make change in social science research, human rights
investigation, and the law. The stories very clearly illustrate how the legal
and human rights of the forty women interviewed were violated by the
actions and inactions of various state actors. 117 The fact that narratives were
156. Id. at 839.
157. Interestingly, a great deal of debate has centered on the validity of the claims that the
report never makes, i.e., that a certain percentage of batterers is awarded custody
inappropriately. These claims were part of the argument discussed previously. See supra note
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used to illuminate the problems in the Massachusetts family courts should
not have precluded state actors from crediting its allegations.
The problem with these narratives is not that they are the stories of
individuals. Instead, their credibility is compromised by who is telling the
stories-battered women. Women's voices have historically been
discounted by the legal system, and battered women are particularly
suspect. The next section looks at the legacy of silenced women and gender
bias in the courts to argue that the storytellers, not the stories themselves,
were what kept Battered Mothers Speak Out from achieving the kind of
policy change it should have prompted.
V. NARRATIVE AND GENDER
The effectiveness of Battered Mothers Speak Out as an impetus for court
change depends largely on whether the narratives of the forty battered
mothers it contains are believed. The willingness to believe these stories is
tied to assumptions about the credibility of women's testimony. This section
asks whether women's stories-particularly battered women's stories-are
generally deemed credible by judges and other state actors, or, alternatively,
whether women face an uphill battle in having their stories believed. Social
science research and legal scholarship on the credibility of women,
reinforced by reports studying gender bias in the courts in the 1980s and
1990s, suggest that the latter is true.
A. Devaluing Women's Stories
For women's stories to be believed, they must first be heard. Elizabeth
Schneider, building on the work of Carol Gilligan, has suggested that being
heard is a two-step process. 58 Schneider explains:
The first stage is to recognize women's different voice, or voices,
and to make it possible for these voices to be heard. The second
stage is to recognize all the ways women's voices can be heard
153 and text accompanying note. Carrie Cuthbert finds it ironic that father's rights organizations
have effectively advanced their agenda in terms of organizing, legislative change, and media
attention, without any kind of empirical data (let alone methodologically rigorous studies)
supporting their claims that fathers are.denied equal access to their children. E-mail from Carrie
Cuthbert, Co-Founder and Former Director, Women's Rights Network and the Battered
Mother's Testimony Project (May 12, 2005) (on file with author).
158. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 102-03
(2000).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
TELLING STORIES, SAVING LIVES
and yet not really heard-to identify what I call the complexities
of voice. 159
While Schneider believes that women's voices are beginning to be
incorporated into American law, those voices nonetheless "may not really
be heard" for a number of reasons.
160
Listeners may find it difficult to sort through the plurality of women's
voices, as there is no singular "women's voice." 161 Moreover, the stories
that battered women tell are stories of violence, from which men
"disconnect" and women "dissociate;" "both responses might be understood
as forms of denial."'
162
Gender bias further muffles the voices of women in the legal system.
Bias against women continues to pervade American society 163 and the legal
system is no exception.
"That women have voluntarily engaged law at all is a triumph of
determination over experience. It has not been an act of faith." 164 Bias
against women has long been an issue for courts, in part because women
operate in a legal system developed by men, for men. 65 While women
159. Id.; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Hearing Women Not Being Heard: On Carol
Gilligan's Getting Civilized and the Complexity of Voice, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1994).
160. SCHNEIDER, supra note 158, at 103.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Philip N. Cohen & Matt L. Huffman, Individuals, Jobs and Labor Markets:
The Devaluation of Women's Work, 68 AM. Soc. REV. 443 (2003) (examining gender bias in
employment); Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against
Women in the Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHics 13, 21 (2001) (arguing that women's
reports of pain are taken less seriously by doctors than men's); Bernice Lott, The Devaluation of
Women's Competence, 41 J. Soc. IssuEs 43, 47-51 (1985) (outlining research on women's
competence as measured through external evaluation); Theodore W. McDonald, Loren L.
Toussaint & Jennifer A. Schweiger, The Influence of Social Status on Token Women Leaders'
Expectations About Leading Male-Dominated Groups, 50 SEx RoLEs 401, 402-03 (2004)
(describing studies on women's lower social status); see also Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the
Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 263 n.52 (1993) (citing gender bias studies); Lynn Hecht Schafran,
Gender Bias in the Courts: Time Is Not the Cure, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 413, 416-17 (1988-
89) (citing studies).
164. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1285 (1991).
165. As Catharine MacKinnon notes, "[n]o woman had a voice in the design of the legal
institutions that rule the social order under which women, as well as men, live. Nor was the
condition of women taken into account or the interest of women as a sex represented." Id. at
1281; see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 158, at 104-05; Christy Gleason, Presence, Perspectives
and Power: Gender and the Rationale Differences in the Debate Over the Violence Against
Women Act, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 1, 9 (2001) (describing the judiciary as "an institution
steeped in male tradition and dominated by male perspectives on the bench and in chambers...
."); Regina Graycar, The Gender of Judgments: Some Reflections on "Bias," 32 U. B.C. L. REV.
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involved with the courts are devalued 66 in any number of ways, one crucial
manifestation of this bias is the tendency of legal system actors to doubt
women's credibility.' 67 Studies of jurors reveal the belief that women are
"less rational, less trustworthy, and more likely to exaggerate than men."
1 68
These doubts about credibility stem from the prevailing consensus of how a
credible witness sounds: "like a man."169 Judges may even require more
evidence from women than men to prove the same claims.1 70 Questions
about women's truthfulness have long been raised in the context of rape and
sexual assault;' 7' such doubts now surface in cases where women allege
1, 4 (1998) (arguing that if "'gender' [is] when something is done by or pertains to women, and
'bias' connotes deviation from a norm that is never articulated, but is in fact a white, male norm,
then a case can be made for the proposition that judging is, or is perceived as, a white male
activity.").
166. Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 755-56 (2001) (describing devaluing as "bias that
may or may not be legally prohibited."). Devaluing "operates to affix a 'gender' or 'race' to a
neutral activity or category and simultaneously to place it on a hierarchy of value"-- for
example, women's credibility or women's testimony. Id. at 772. One notable feature of
devaluation is that it is "masked," making it difficult to determine whether it is operating within
the system. Id. at 774-75.
167. Lynn Hecht Schafran suggests that there are three forms of credibility: collective
credibility, or credibility resulting from membership in a group; contextual credibility, or
credibility which depends on an understanding of the context of the claim; and consequential
credibility, or being taken seriously, especially having harms done to you taken seriously. Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, in SUBTLE SEXISM:
CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 216-225 (Nijole V. Benokraitis ed., 1997).
Schafran argues that women lack all three forms of credibility in the legal system. Id.; see also
Kathy Mack, Continuing Barriers to Women's Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof
Process, 4 CRIM. L.F. 327, 332 (1993).
168. Linell A. Letendre, Comment, Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington
Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence, 75 WASH. L. REV.
973, 981 (2000) (citations omitted).
169. Women are more likely to exhibit speech features associated with powerlessness (high
pitch, frequent smiling, less numerical specificity) and speak hesitantly, even if certain, while
men are more likely to use more numerical specificity, although less accurately, and to speak
confidently even if unsure or wrong. Judges may be more likely to ascribe blame to a person
using a powerless speech style. Mack, supra note 167, at 330-31.
170. Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: Social Change Strategies, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 4 (1990) (citing Maryland's gender bias study).
171. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner: Brzonkala v. Morrison; U.S. v. Morrison, 9 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 315, 334-35 (2000) (describing how judges and other state actors subject
rape victims to excessive scrutiny, casting doubt on their credibility) (citations omitted); Jan
Jordan, Beyond Belief? Police, rape and women's credibility, 4 CRIM. JUSTICE 29, 30-31
(discussing how women's credibility is doubted by police and judges in rape cases). See
generally Mack, supra note 167, at 332-38. These questions persist even in the absence of
studies confirming that women lie about rape more frequently than other victims lie about other
crimes. See, e.g., State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d 308 (N.J. 2004); Susan Estrich, Palm Beach
Stories, 11 L. & PHIL. 5, 13 (1992).
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other forms of injury, like sexual harassment or sex-based discrimination. 172
The wishes expressed by women in right-to-die cases are routinely
discounted, while those of men are respected. 173 The stories of women of
color have been subject to especially harsh scrutiny. 174 So have the stories of
battered women.
Battered mothers confront the same skepticism about their credibility as
other women, but their testimony is further shadowed by myths and
stereotypes about victims of domestic violence. 175 Because stories about
172. The Honorable Diane Wood explained why who makes credibility determinations is
important, stating:
[A]ll cases begin with a story: a story told by the potential plaintiff
about something that happened to her that she believes may have violated her
legal rights. Who hears those stories? Who believes them? What difference
does it make if someone thinks they are plausible or not? On what will the
listener draw in making that crucial initial determination? . . . Who created
that law, which I remind you must be followed under the principles of stare
decisis? In a word, men. Now you well might ask-indeed, you have an
obligation to ask-why that should make any difference .... [T]here is still
an experiential gap between the finest man and the average woman when it
comes to sex discrimination. [This gap] has an impact on a trial judge's
assessment of a record ......
Diane P. Wood, Sex Discrimination in Life and Law, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4-5 (1999).
Judge Wood concludes that "these stories are still falling on deaf, or partially deaf, ears." Id.
173. Ronald L. Ellis & Lynn Hecht Schafran, Achieving Race and Gender Fairness in the
Courtroom, in THE JUDGE'S BOOK 91, 110 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE JUDGE'S BOOK]
(citing study on decision-making in right-to-die cases where no living will exists). The Judge's
Book concludes about the findings of that study, "[i]n other words, men are rational,
independent beings whose moral agency must be respected even when they become
incompetent, but women are only children." Id.
174. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, Remarks before
the National Forum for Women State Legislators (Nov. 15, 1991), in 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467,
1470 (1992) (describing how perceptions of black women's chastity affect their credibility);
THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 173, at 113 (discussing bias against black victims of domestic
violence). See generally Maria L. Ontiveros, Rosa Lopez, David Letterman, Christopher
Darden, and Me: Issues of Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Evaluating Witness Credibility, 6
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 135 (1995) (examining how the failure to understand class, race, and
gender issues affected determinations of a witness's credibility).
175. Studies show that:
[J]urors construct stories based on the evidence presented and the jurors'
own life experiences . . . . [Jiurors may 'fill in the blanks' of the story,
consciously or unconsciously, based on their own life experiences .... Thus,
if jurors accept the commonly held myths about domestic violence and the
defense further reinforces these misconceptions at trial, they may 'fill in the
blanks' with an unrealistic view of the violent relationship, and their
evaluation of the evidence may be based on misconceptions and prejudices
unsupported by scientific research.
Carolyn Copps Hartley, "He Said, She Said": The Defense Attack of Credibility in Domestic
Violence Felony Trials, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 510, 539 (2001) (citations omitted).
Judges are likely subject to the same thought processes. In fact, The Judge's Book warns,
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domestic violence "often appear to judges as problems relating to
personality flaws, relationships gone bad, anger and jealousy," and
therefore as deviations by both parties from the standards of acceptable
behavior between intimate partners, judges can more easily discount the
credibility of the women telling the stories.'76 Battered women frequently
respond to violence in ways that are suspect to those who place their faith in
the legal system: refusing to turn to police and courts,'77 delaying the telling
of their stories, minimizing or underestimating harms, and revising stories
as they recover from the abuse.'78 Moreover, judges who lack experience
with domestic violence may rely on courthouse assumptions about the
dubious legitimacy of such claims and the pretextual reasons women have
for filing them. 179 Judges question the ulterior motives of women bringing
domestic violence claims-"they are often considered manipulators and
liars intent on using the court to achieve some wrongful purpose, such as
revenge or advantage in a divorce case"-further calling their credibility
into doubt. 80
Battered Mothers Speak Out documents how state actors question the
truthfulness of battered mothers' allegations of abuse in the context of
"Judges should be careful not to project their own powerful positions in life onto battered
women and assess or direct these women's actions in the context of their own vastly different
life situations." THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 173, at 111.
176. Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomoly: Between "The
Truly National and the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1116 (2001); see also Susan Scott,
Judge, Super. Ct. of NJ., Panel Discussion: Advocating for Victims of Domestic Violence (Oct.
7, 1998), in 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 73, 76-77 (1999). This particular judge had difficulty
discerning which claims were true because the "word around the underground" was that
domestic violence claims were being fabricated to evict men from their homes. Id. at 76. The
judge noted a recent case in which a judge denied a restraining order, finding "on the basis of
the record, it seemed like the allegations were fabricated," only to have the abuser kill his victim
and himself shortly thereafter. Id. at 77.
177. For reasons why battered women might avoid the legal system, see generally Leigh
Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of
Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 7 (2004).
178. SCHNEIDER, supra note 158, at 106-07. One study of simulated sexual harassment
trials suggests that women are deemed most credible when they are emotional and their
harassers are not; when both the victim and perpetrator are emotional, the credibility of the
victim declined. Margaret Gibbs et al., Factors Affecting Credibility in a Simulated Sexual
Harassment Hearing, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 366, 376 (1995).
179. Weissman, supra note 176, at 1120-22; see also Graycar, supra note 165, at 14-16
(arguing that courts use the concept of judicial notice to "incorporate into their judgments
commonsense ideas about the world, common assumptions or, indeed, widely held
misconceptions" and asking "whose knowledge 'common knowledge' is and whose version of
reality has authority.")
180. Weissman, supra note 176, at 1122.
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custody decision-making.181 The report's finding that actors in the
Massachusetts family courts believe that women fabricate claims of abuse is
consistent with other discussions on the perceived credibility of battered
women. In fact, judges are often skeptical-and encouraged to be skeptical-
of battered women's claims, 82 particularly when custody is at issue. As
Martha Fineman notes in her discussion of the National Interdisciplinary
Colloquium on Child Custody's Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on
Child Custody Law: A Deskbook for Judges (the "Deskbook"):
[T]he Deskbookfor Judges appears to anticipate that disbelief is to
be not only expected but also encouraged as the initial judicial
response. The Deskbook's chapter on domestic violence devotes
an entire section (one out of only five in total) to credibility. Titled
'Problems of Proof; Determining Credibility,' the section begins
with the statement of 'common knowledge that, for a variety of
reasons, psychological as well as familial, determining the truth
when allegations of domestic violence emerge is a difficult
business.' 1
83
The Deskbook admonishes judges not to allow abusive spouses to offer
excuses for their conduct, but also instructs them to take a "similarly firm
stance" against parents who complain of "common (if hardly exemplary)
behavior" or who make false claims of abuse.184 Fineman asks, "[w]hat are
judges to make of this series of statements, particularly since actual
violence is equated with exaggeration and misrepresentation of violence for
purposes of provoking judicial wrath?" 18 5 Fineman concludes:
181. BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1, at 41. Joan Meier argues that this
skepticism makes any claim of judicial neutrality inherently suspect; "those who are
predisposed to believe that women often fabricate or exaggerate domestic violence allegations
are likely to be harder to persuade of the truth of such allegations, than those who are
predisposed to believe that men frequently beat women." Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence,
Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the
Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 657, 682 (2003).
182. Social science research has found that men and women perceive domestic violence
differently: "[w]hat some men may see as normal and ordinary behavior, many women consider
potentially violent." Renee L. Jarusinsky, Gender Difference in Perceiving Violence and Its
Implication for the VA WA's Civil Rights Remedy, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 965, 984-85 (2000)
(citing Russell P. Dobash et al., Separate and Intersecting Realities: A Comparison of Men's
and Women's Accounts of Violence Against Women, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 382 (1998)).
This "gender gap" in perception necessarily colors the way in which a legal system constructed
on the male experience looks at claims of domestic violence.
183. Martha Albertson Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM. L.Q.
211,212, 218-19 (2002) (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. Id. Fineman further notes that the Deskbook treats acts of violence as less serious when
they "arise in the context of divorce in marriages without a long-standing history of prior
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The Deskbook suggests that judges look for collaboration from
other credible witnesses or police reports or else reasons why a
woman did not complain earlier. The inference is that many
women are likely to lie or exaggerate about the men with whom
they find themselves entangled within the legal system .... The
commentary and approach of the Deskbook is couched in the belief
that men need protection from the lies of women, who are
vindictive and unscrupulous and who will say and do anything at
the expense of their children.'
186
Encouraging judges and other state actors to be skeptical of claims of
domestic violence creates a Catch-22 for a battered mother: if she doesn't
raise the issue, the court has no context for considering her actions and her
reluctance to permit unsupervised visitation or share custody with her
former partner. If she discloses the abuse, the attitudes of judges and others
make it:
highly unusual for a battered woman in private litigation to be
recognized by a court to be sincerely advocating for her children's
safety. Rather, her very status as a litigant, a mother, and battered,
seems to ensure that she will be viewed as, at best, merely self-
interested, and at worst, not credible.
187
Given the skepticism with which judges approach individual litigants'
claims of domestic violence, it is hardly surprising that the collective stories
in Battered Mothers Speak Out were dismissed by the Massachusetts
judges.
incidents," which ignores the frequency with which separation triggers domestic violence. Id. at
220.
186. Id. at 222-23. These inferences are made despite the understanding of professionals
working with domestic violence victims that women are actually reluctant to disclose abuse to
legal system professionals, particularly in custody cases, because of fear of both the abuser and
the system's perception of women who make such claims. Id. at 218; see also Meier, supra note
181, at 684. This skepticism about battered women's claims, Meier notes, is exacerbated
because "common assumptions about witness credibility backfire when applied to victims and
perpetrators of domestic violence." Id. at 690. Battered women often appear angry or emotional
or display inappropriate affect (a symptom of post-traumatic-stress disorder); judges and
evaluators may be more inclined to believe the calm, charming, and vehement denials of the
abuser instead. Id. at 690-92. Judges who lack an understanding of domestic violence may have
difficulty squaring the picture of the composed and persuasive litigant before them with the
abusive father described by the battered woman. As the California Judicial Council Advisory
Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts noted in the context of child sexual abuse allegations,
"it is much easier and more in accordance with our images of the world to regard a mother as
crazy or hysterical than to recognize an otherwise seemingly rational and caring father as
capable of the behaviors described." THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 173, at 123-24 (citations
omitted).
187. Meier, supra note 181, at 686.
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VI. GENDER BIAS STUDIES
Gender bias1 88 lurks in the shadows of the legal landscape confronting
battered mothers. The limited acknowledgment of the existence of gender
bias in the courts is directly attributable to the work of the gender bias task
forces formed in thirty-nine states and a number of federal circuits in the
1980s and 1990s.189 Not surprisingly, one of the major findings of the
gender bias task forces was "that state court systems are seriously
compromised by gender bias, and most frequently and dramatically, the
victims are women"' 9°-particularly battered women. Jeanette Swent
summarizes the reports as follows: "[w]omen receive unfavorable
substantive outcomes in cases because of their gender, and men do not.
Women's complaints are trivialized and their circumstances misconstrued
more often than men's, and women more often than men are victims of
demeaning and openly hostile behavior in court proceedings."'
191
Both the federal and state task forces found that the credibility of women
litigants was regularly questioned. 192 In the Ninth Circuit, questions about
women's credibility arose in the context of Social Security disability
cases. 193 Both male and female claimant representatives reported that
women's disability claims were less likely to be believed than men's.194
Women's claims were more often seen as "complaints about life" than
"legally-cognizable harms."' 95 New York's task force stated, "[j]udges,
attorneys and court personnel do not give as much credibility to women as
to men, and perceive women as acting differently from men."'196 Missouri
and Georgia's task forces acknowledged the body of social science
188. While the task forces looked at bias against both men and women, "'women' are the
relevant category ... in much of the work of Gender Bias Task Forces. Officially, court-based
task forces embrace concerns about discrimination against anyone based on gender. In practice,
'gender-bias' task forces inquire principally about and document discrimination against women
in the legal system." Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1691-92 (1991).
189. Myra C. Selby, Examining Race and Gender Bias in the Courts: A Legacy of
Indifference or Opportunity?, 32 IND. L. REV. 1167, 1168-70 (1999) (providing the history of
the task force movement).
190. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State
Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1, 34 (1996).
191. Id. at 55.
192. Id. at 61.
193. Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias
Task Force: Executive Summary of the Preliminary Report of the Ninth Circuit Task Force on
Gender Bias, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2153, 2168 (1993).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2173.
196. See Unified Court System of the State of New York, Report of the New York Task
Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 31-35 (1986).
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literature suggesting that women are perceived as less credible; Missouri's
report notes that male and female attorneys disagreed as to whether judges
found male witnesses more credible than females. 97
Some state reports specifically addressed credibility in the context of
domestic violence cases. Karen Czapanskiy notes that although every
gender bias study found women litigants were treated as less credible than
men, "[t]he problem seems particularly acute when the issue is a woman's
accusation that a man has been violent toward her."' 98 Jeannette Swent's
analysis of the gender bias task force reports suggests that a victim of
domestic violence may "find[] her toughest adversary on the judicial
bench."' 99 In Virginia, "female family law attorneys, female prosecutors and
those who provide services to victims of family abuse believe that judges do
not know enough about the dynamics of family abuse" and minimize the
claims of victims both in the context of protection order and custody
cases. 200 Missouri's report documented how victims of domestic violence
felt the merits of their claims were ignored. These victims felt disbelieved,
blamed, and belittled by the questions asked by judges and the perception of
other system actors that women were misusing the protective order process
to "harass men or to obtain an advantage in domestic relations
proceedings," despite the absence of any evidence to support that
211contention. Missouri's report admonishes, "[c]oncern for system abuse
should not cause judges to overlook the fact that, in a violent relationship,
197. Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, Report of the Missouri Task Force on
Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L. REV. 485, 641-42 (1993). This difference in perception may be
based on the different experiences of men and women, or on different interpretations of those
experiences. Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2206
(1993).
198. Czapanskiy, supra note 170, at 253-54.
199. Swent, supra note 190, at 58.
200. Gender Bias in the Courts Task Force, Gender Bias in the Courts of the
Commonwealth Final Report, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 705, 750-54 (2001). More than
70% of female attorneys and almost 70% of service providers surveyed said that judges in
Virginia handling domestic violence cases were "almost never, rarely, or only sometimes
knowledgeable" about their dynamics. Philip Trompeter, Gender Bias Task Force: Comments
on Family Law Issues, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001). The report tells the story of
a woman who requested protection from the local magistrate, who told her, "[1]ittle girl ... you
don't really want to do anything to your husband. I'm not going to do anything. I want you to
just go and drive around for awhile. He's sure to cool down." Gender Bias in the Courts Task
Force, supra at 753.
201. The Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 197, at 504-06, 519-20.
The Task Force noted the conclusion of the Maryland Task Force Report that "[flar from
overusing, abusing and manipulating the court system, women are, by and large, intimidated by
the system and are underutilizing it in vast numbers." Id. at 522 (citing GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS: REPORT OF THE MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE
COURTS 3 (1989)).
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the filing of a divorce action can trigger additional violence. '20 2 In
Maryland, the task force heard how a judge's inability to connect his own
experience to that of a battered woman led him to deny the woman a
protective order despite her allegation that her husband had threatened her
with a gun:
[The judge] took a few minutes to decide on the matter and he
looked at me and he said, "I don't believe anything that you're
saying .... The reason I don't believe it is because I don't believe
that anything like this could happen to me .... Therefore, since I
would not let that happen to me, I can't believe that it happened to
you."
20 3
Responses to the gender bias task forces were mixed. The studies made
some professionals uncomfortable and others angry. As the Ninth Circuit's
Task Force on Gender Bias noted:
Many men and women share a feeling that these issues are close,
and sometimes too close for comfort. While much of our other
work at some level implicates one personally, questions of gender
are so plainly about ourselves, about the construction of our lives
and our relationships, that the protective veneer of professionalism
often fades. In practical terms, this proximity translates into a
reticence, a nervousness, and sometimes even a hostility to
approaching the issues raised here.2 °4
When Karen Czapanskiy presented her study of the gender bias task
forces, she noted that "a number of the comments fell into two categories: I
don't believe you because your numbers are inconsistent with my
experience, or I don't believe you because your experience is inconsistent
with what I think the numbers are. 20 5
202. Id. at 525.
203. MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, GENDER
BIAS IN THE COURTS: REPORT OF THE MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS
IN THE COURTS 2-3 (1989). The woman described her reaction to the experience; "to sit up in
court and make myself open up and recount all my feelings and fear and then have it thrown
back in my face as being totally untrue just because this big man would not allow anyone to do
this to him, placed me in a state of shock which probably hasn't left me yet." Id. at 3. See also
Czapanskiy; supra note 170, at 255 (quoting a Florida lawyer who was told by a judge that he
and his client were "overreacting"; a day later, the client's husband tied the woman up, locked
her in a room, threatened to kill her, and then killed himself outside her door). While the task
force reports certainly prompted change, recent commentators note that much progress is still
needed. See infra note 212, at 745.
204. Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, supra note 193, at 2175.
205. Czapanskiy, supra note 170, at 248.
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Some of the comments, however, hinged on the methodology that the
studies had used to reach their conclusions of widespread gender bias in the
courts. The task forces used a variety of methods to collect data on gender
bias;20 6 collecting the narratives of those who had experienced gender bias
(mainly women) was one of the primary methods used.20 7 Hearing the
women's stories helped task force members to understand the challenges
women faced in engaging the courts and enhanced the credibility of the
victims. 208 And while "a particular story might be unverifiable, masses of
consistent testimony gathered from a variety of sources and using various
research methods persuaded members that gender bias did infect the
courts., 20 9 The task forces debated how to present their findings. Early task
forces worried that their conclusions and recommendations could not be
sufficiently bolstered by the stories of women alleging gender bias; later
task forces relied more heavily on the voices of those who testified to give
their reports "life" and "passion.2 10 Such attention to information gathering
techniques and presentation did not impress everyone, however.
Applauding a decision to deny further federal funding to gender bias
studies, Senator Orrin Hatch called the studies "ill-conceived, deeply flawed
and divisive . . . methodologically biased and flawed"2' '-ironically, the
same charges leveled against Battered Mothers Speak Out.
206. As Barbara Babcock noted, "[t]he mixture of quantitative data and experiential
testimony that has been a fixture of task force reports is the lawyer's form of consciousness-
raising, the recounting of individual stories is the paradigmatic feminist method." Barbara Allen
Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and Legal Education, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 2143, 2148 (1993).
207. Some questioned the use of narratives not because of their reliability, but because of
the strain placed on those testifying. The Honorable Philip Trumpeter wrote:
I recall a woman who was scheduled to speak at the public hearing in
Roanoke, but because she was so intimidated by the tone of the participants,
mostly fathers who were very strident at that hearing, she did not testify. She
testified a few days later, traveling a good distance to a hearing in Abingdon,
in which I participated. She delayed her testimony because she just did not
feel comfortable. I simply do not feel that any adult should be expected to
bear his or her soul or suffer embarrassment by speaking about a highly
personal and possibly traumatic life experience in front of a group of
strangers .... [A]lthough I support the methodology and I would not have
changed it, I did not feel that the public hearings were that beneficial in this
area.
Trompeter, supra note 200, at 1094. But see Massoud, supra note 5, at 30-32 (arguing
that women are empowered by the opportunity to tell their stories publicly).
208. See Swent, supra note 190, at 46-47.
209. Id. at 47.
210. Id. at 63-64.
211. 141 CONG. REc. S14, 691-92 (Sept. 29, 1995) (quoted in Swent, supra note 190, at 3.)
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Massachusetts' task force made findings similar to those of other states.
The Gender Bias Study Committee:
found gender bias to be in operation when decisions made or
actions taken were based on preconceived or stereotypical notions
about the nature, role, or capacity of men and women. We
observed the effect of myths and misconceptions about the
economic and social realities of men's and women's lives and
about the relative value of their work.212
Specifically, the study found that "female litigants .. .are faced with
unnecessary and unacceptable obstacles that can be explained only in terms
of their gender., 213 Such gender-biased treatment of female litigants
"undermines credibility and confidence and thereby places unwarranted
burdens" on them.2 4 The gender bias in the Massachusetts courts
"weaken[s] female litigants' testimony. When women . . . are denied
credibility because of their gender, the courts are seriously impaired in their
ability to deliver justice to anyone in our society."2"5 The issue of credibility
is of particular concern in the context of domestic violence. The Gender
Bias Study Committee explained, "[t]he tendency to doubt the testimony of
domestic violence victims and to 'blame' them for their predicament not
only hampers the court's ability to provide victims with the protection they
deserve, it also has a chilling effect on victims' willingness to seek
relief., 216 A sizeable number of judges believed that female victims were
deemed less credible in cases of domestic violence and sexual assault.1 7
The Committee found that victims were asked what they had done to
deserve the abuse, why they were seeking protection in the absence of
physical injuries, why they waited to seek relief from the courts, and why
212. Gender Bias Study Committee, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Gender Bias
Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEw ENG. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990).
213. Id. at 757.
214. Gender Bias Study Committee, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Report of
the Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 23 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 575, 635 (1989).
215. Gender Bias Study Committee, supra note 212, at 758. The study found that 14% of
judges, 20% of counsel and 14% of court employees had observed the statements of female
victims, litigants, or witnesses being given less weight than those of similarly situated men.
Gender Bias Study Committee, supra note 214, at 669.
216. Gender Bias Study Committee, supra note 214, at 585-86. One Massachusetts judge,
who subsequently retired, unabashedly told the press that he doubted the credibility of women
who filed for protective orders. Id. at 594. Another yelled at women seeking restraining orders,
"[y]ou are worse than my wife," and refused to allow female victims to fully testify, making
decisions without hearing their stories. Id. at 662.
217. Id. at 670. A smaller number of judges responded that women's testimony is given less
credibility than men's regardless of the type of case. Id.
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they were bothering the courts with their problems. 218 The study also found
that judges and family service officers were not adequately considering
violence against women in making custody decisions,219 and that a majority
of judges believed that "[m]others allege child sexual abuse to gain a
bargaining advantage in the divorce process."22 The study made a number
of recommendations to address these findings of bias against women in the
Massachusetts courts.
2 2 1
The Massachusetts Committee for Gender Equality, charged with
implementing the task force recommendations, created a widely praised
eight-page brochure containing rules for avoiding gender bias.222 But as
Jeannette Swent notes, the simplicity of the product "is also its downfall.
While the pamphlet may reduce the number of 'honey' stories, it will not
produce meaningful insight into how gender bias works. Neither will it
discourage anything more subtle than a pat on the fanny in open court. 2 23
The stories of the women in Battered Mothers Speak Out bear out Swent's
prediction.
While some progress has been made since the gender bias task force
reports were issued, a follow-up study in Maryland revealed that "'no group
perceives gender ... bias as non-existent or even close to non-existent' ....
Gender problems persist in the treatment of domestic violence victims and
the application of laws., 2 4 Battered Mothers Speak Out verifies that the
gender bias identified by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1990
continues to exist in Massachusetts as well, particularly for battered mothers
seeking custody of their children. In the face of gender bias, questions about
women's credibility, and the legacy of skepticism about battered women's
claims, it is hardly surprising that the narratives contained in the report
218. Id. at 602.
219. Id. at 599. The Committee recommended the passage of legislation to "provide
guidance to the probate courts on how to consider the existence of serious or repeated spousal
abuse when making orders for the custody and visitation of children." Id. Massachusetts
subsequently enacted such legislation, but how effective that legislation has been in
Massachusetts or the other states that have adopted it is subject to debate. See Leigh Goodmark,
From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should Do For Children in Family
Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 254-75 (1999); see generally Nancy K. D. Lemon,
Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers: How Effective Are
They?, 28 WM. MtTCHELL L. REV. 601 (2001).
220. Gender Bias Study Committee, supra note 212, at 843.
221. Id. at 849-50
222. Swent, supra note 190, at 74.
223. Id.
224. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Strides in Gender Equality, XXXV MD. BAR JOuRNAL 51, 52-
53 (2002).
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failed to sway state actors in Massachusetts. 5 Given the difficulties in
making battered women's stories audible to decision-makers, should the
authors of Battered Mothers Speak Out have chosen a different method to
document the human rights abuses they found? The next section considers
that question.
VII. WHO (OR WHAT) SHOULD TELL THE STORY?
The credibility of women, particularly battered women, in the courts is
so compromised that using the narratives of battered women to convince
state actors that change in the courts is needed may be a futile endeavor.
How, then, can those seeking change convince those in power that change is
needed? Should battered women's stories be told in the third person, rather
than the first? Should the experiences of battered women be conveyed by
statistics, rather than words? Both of those approaches are considered
below.
A. Third Person Narratives: Court Watch
One method that investigators working on Battered Mothers Speak Out
used to verify the claims of their subjects was to attend hearings with the
battered mothers and document what they saw and heard.226 Volunteers and
professionals in a number of states have performed similar services through
court monitoring projects. 7 Court monitoring, or court watch, programs
"help the system reach its potential by identifying flaws, recommending
solutions, and advocating for change" based on the cases that court
monitors observe.2 8 Court watch programs also help communities enhance
225. Even the credentials of the investigators, many of whom graduated from and worked
at elite institutions, and the respect in Massachusetts for the organization that sponsored the
report, Wellesley Centers for Women, were insufficient to trump the suspicion with which
battered women are heard. E-mail from Carrie Cuthbert, Co-Founder and Former Director,
Women's Rights Network and the Battered Mother's Testimony Project (May 12, 2005) (on file
with author).
226. See generally BATrERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT, supra note 1.
227. See, e.g., infra note 228.
228. WATCH, Developing a Court Monitoring Program, http://www.watchmn.org/
pdfs/order-form.pdf; see also Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, Community
Court Watch II: A Study of Bergen County Family Court System and the Enforcement of the
State of New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 79, 82
(1995) ("Above all things, the Community Court Watch Project is an instrument of change.
Observation, recommendation and action have been blended together to impact positively the
way in which domestic violence cases are addressed in court.").
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their understanding of the court process. As one court watch participant
explains,
The courts exist on behalf of the community, but the community is
not educated enough to know what is going on, nor are they in a
position to be able to tell the courts what they think they ought to
be doing .... [O]ur calling is to be able to bring back to the
community as a whole, anecdotal information; here is what is
happening in the courts, these are the kinds of sentences that
people are getting, this is the way judges are treating victims, this
is the way judges are treating perpetrators.229
When state actors are skeptical about reports coming from those who use
the courts, "a 'court watch' program may provide the necessary
documentation of dubious behavior" and give judges the impetus to change
their ways. 230 "Court watch" programs can also help to dispel myths about
the way litigants use the court process.231
Judges are acutely aware of the scrutiny of those who report on the
proceedings in their courtrooms.232 In one infamous Maryland domestic
violence case, the judge noted that "because no one was present from the
victim's family or a victim's advocacy group, he could sentence 'in
anonymity. He also alluded to the influence that Mothers Against
Drunk Driving has had in pressuring judges to sentence drunk drivers
severely. 234 His comments imply that had someone been watching him when
he considered the case of a man who pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter
for shooting his wife in the head with a hunting rifle after finding her with
229. Symposium, Panel Discussion: Morning Session, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 439, 455
(2003) (comments of Pam Wiseman, Executive Director, Safe Passage Shelter, DeKalb,
Illinois).
230. Sarah M. Buel, Domestic Violence and the Law: An Impassioned Exploration for
Family Peace, 33 FAM. L.Q. 719, 739-40 (1999) (describing the success of a court watch
conducted by women in a small fishing village in Alaska after a judge refused to take abuse
against one woman's granddaughter seriously); see also System Shouldn't Victimize Battered,
Too, LANSING ST. J., May 20, 2004, at 15A (describing how Ingham County's court watch
program has increased awareness of legal system actors).
231. See Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 228, at 83, 87
(arguing that court watch findings that only 11-16% of women seeking protective orders had
pending divorces dispelled myth that women used protective order process to bolster
settlements and custody claims in divorces).
232. Court watch programs may also be unpopular with judges who perceive that "court
watchers are 'out to get' them." Paige Akin, Keeping Watch Over Justice: Program Aims to
Protect Abuse Victims, But Some Fear It Will Disrupt Courts, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH,
Sept. 13, 2004, at A-1.
233. Lynn Hecht Schafran, There's No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1079
(1995) (discussing State v. Peacock, 94-CR-0943 (1994)).
234. Id. at 1064.
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another man, the sentence might have been more severe than eighteen
months of work release and fifty hours of community service.235 The judge
might also have refrained from referring to the man as a "noncriminal" and
speculating that most married men would have inflicted some "corporal
punishment" in that situation.2 36 After a group of grandmothers in Alaska sat
in court for a few days to watch a judge handling domestic violence cases,
the judge asked the women what they wanted; they told him exactly what he
needed to do differently to comply with state law.237 Within six months, the
court had changed its practices, a change the women reinforced with
occasional return visits.
238
Why might the results reported from "court watch" programs be more
credible than the first person narratives of the women who use court
systems? "Court watch" programs use "objective" volunteers who have no
stake in the proceedings,239 although many participate specifically because
they have concerns about how justice is being administered. 240 Court
watchers may be able to articulate concerns about the treatment of battered
women, concerns which, coming from battered women, would be easy to
dismiss as self-serving.24' The reports of court watchers are imbued with a
credibility that first person accounts from battered women seem to lack,
answering the claims of bias leveled at the narratives battered mothers tell
of their interactions with the family court system.
235. Id. at 1063-64.
236. See id.
237. Buel, supra note 230, at 739-40.
238. Id.
239. A study of Bergen County, New Jersey's Court Watch II raised concerns about
"solicitousness on the part of the judges .... However, monitors did express confidence in their
ability to remain objective and generate valid findings." Bergen County Commission on the
Status of Women, supra note 228, at 90.
240. One court watch organization focusing its efforts on cases involving violence against
children and women describes its volunteers as follows: "WATCH volunteers are civic-minded
people who come from a wide variety of backgrounds," and are "motivated by their concern for
the safety and welfare of abused and neglected children in our community." REBECCA KuTrY,
WATCH's MONITORING OF OPEN CHIPS CASES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY JUVENILE COURT IA
(2001). In Richmond, Virginia, one defense attorney noted a concern that a court watch program
was "really an advocacy group in disguise," noting the large red buttons reading "Safe at
Home" that court watch volunteers wear in the courtroom. Akin, supra note 232, at A- 1.
241. WATCH documented how a victim seeking a protective order was interrogated about
why she remained with her batterer, while the batterer was largely ignored. KUTY, supra note
240, at 5C. If the victim had articulated her discomfort with these questions, she might easily
have been told that the questions were appropriate, and her concerns about the judge's
demeanor-and its effect on her-dismissed.
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B. "Objective" Reports on Family Courts
Conveying the experiences of battered mothers through numbers rather
than words is another option. Although quantitative research is subject to
some of the same criticisms about objectivity and bias as qualitative
research, policymakers and state actors nonetheless might accept statistical
information about problems with the court process that they refuse to hear
when conveyed in narrative form.
A recent study of the Philadelphia family courts supports this hypothesis.
Justice in the Domestic Relations Division of Philadelphia Family Court: A
Report to the Community details the challenges faced by families who seek
the assistance of the Philadelphia Family Court to address their family
crises.24 2 The study, written by Philadelphia's Women's Law Project
(WLP), was created in response to the numerous accounts received by the
Project "from women who have had difficulties navigating the domestic
relations judicial process and negative experiences trying to present their
cases."
243
The Women's Law Project's report is self-consciously quantitative; as its
authors began their work, "[they] recognized the necessity of using
objective standards to guide both the collection and evaluation of the
information about the Court.",244 The central component of this quantitative
study was a court observation project. The WLP developed two survey
instruments, one for use in custody cases and one for protection from abuse
cases and "developed the forms to be neutral and objective, particularly
because [their] other sources of information were more subjective in
nature. 245 Using those tools, volunteers collected data in various
courtrooms; the data was later entered into a computer system and analyzed
for reliability by testing the correlations between the reports of primary and
secondary observers.246 The courtroom reports were supplemented by the
narrative accounts of volunteer telephone counselors and courtroom
observers, surveys of callers to the Women's Law Project Telephone
Counseling Service, test calls to the Customer Service Unit of the Domestic
242. See generally WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT, JUSTICE IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
OF PHILADELPHIA FAMILY COURT: A REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.womenslawproject.org/ (follow "Philadelphia Family Court: A Report to the
Community" hyperlink under "Reports").
243. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 17.
245. Id. at app. a, at 1.
246. Id. at app. a, at 2.
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Relations Division and a review of court materials.247 While the Women's
Law Project collected the narratives of individual litigants using a variety of
tools, that information was generally presented in collective, numerical
form. The "experience" of using the Domestic Relations Division is
presented "from the consumer's perspective, ' 248 but not in the consumers'
own words.
The reception the Philadelphia report received could not have been more
different than the response to Battered Mothers Speak Out. Although the
report found a number of pervasive problems with the Domestic Relations
Division that threatened the quality of justice afforded litigants, and
questioned whether, given "[t]he prevalence of women as petitioners in
family law matters ... gender bias contributes to the Court's low prestige
and insufficient resources, 249 there was no public outcry. Instead, "[t]he
domestic relations division issued a written thanks to the WLP after the
report was released,"25 and the Board of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar
Association adopted a resolution detailing the report's findings and
pledging its support to "improving the delivery of justice in the Domestic
Relations Division .... ,,21 The study also spurred Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Newman to seek a new building for the Domestic Relations
Division.252
What accounts for this difference? While it could be any number of
different factors, the depersonalization of the information provided in the
report is one possibility to consider. Instead of confronting the court with
the names and first person accounts of aggrieved women, the Philadelphia
report offers numbers and statistics to reach a conclusion remarkably
similar to the one reached in Battered Mothers Speak Out. Opting for a
quantitative report may have made those conclusions easier to hear and
spurred the local legal establishment to action to relieve the conditions
documented in the report.25 3 A California group working on its own
247. Id. at app. a, at 3-5.
248. Id. at 38.
249. Id. at 5.
250. Jennifer Batchelor, Report: Domestic Relations Division Overburdened, THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2003, at 7.
251. Board of Governors, Philadelphia Bar Association, Resolution on Improving the
Delivery of Justice in the Domestic Relations Division of Philadelphia Family Court, (July 24,
2003), available at http://www.philbar.org/member/governance/resolutions/resolution.asp?pubi
d=85877282003.
252. See generally Jill Porter, At Last! New Digs Eyed for Family Court, PHILA. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 30, 2004, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/local/7831944
.htm.
253. Not all quantitative reports of women's interactions with the courts are persuasive to
state actors, however. When quantitative reports have a distinctly feminist agenda, they are
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Battered Mothers' Testimony Project certainly seems to share that belief.
Instead of soliciting the stories of affected women, the California Protective
Parents Association is randomly reviewing 270 files in custody cases
involving domestic violence for its replication of the Battered Mothers'
Testimony Project. Researcher Linda Bernard explains, "[w]e wanted to
avoid the methodological criticisms of projects such as the [Massachusetts]
BMTP and others that it's a biased sample .... 254 The California project is
committed, however, to maintaining the human rights focus. 255
VIII. WHY ARE NARRATIVES SO IMPORTANT?
Given the obstacles created by the use of narratives, and the existence of
other ways of presenting evidence in support of court reform, why should
advocates continue to collect and disseminate the narratives of those
affected by problems with the family courts?
Collecting narratives, particularly in the context of a human rights
investigation, gives battered women an opportunity to share their
experiences and have their stories validated. As one BMTP participant
explained, "U]ust to have someone believe my story literally saved my
life." 25
6
Using narratives to highlight systemic problems can give courts and state
actors the opportunity to develop empathetic understanding of the problems
faced by litigants in the family court. Hearing narratives helped Maryland's
legislators to understand the problems confronted by battered women
seeking protective orders and led directly to reform of the state's domestic
violence laws.257 Jane Murphy describes the impact of the women's
testimony:
received in much the same way that BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT was. The Arizona
Battered Mothers' Testimony Project relies far more heavily on quantitative data than the
Massachusetts report. But, as author Diane Post noted,
So far the report has been met with resounding silence. The major media that
we worked with for a year to do the story pulled it the day before it was to
run, allegedly from judicial pressure. The governmental committees that are
to consider such policy issues give it five minutes, or, after the presentation,
have no comments and go immediately to the next agenda item. The primary
author has been vilified and the report denigrated.
Diane Post, Arizona Battered Mothers' Testimony Project: A Human Rights Approach
to Child Custody and Domestic Violence, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, Dec.-Jan.
2004, at 21, 29.
254. Slote, supra note 10, at 6.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 2; see also Massoud, supra note 5, at 31.
257. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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Ultimately, this is a story about domestic violence victims and
their advocates, who forced decision-makers to listen after decades
of inattention to the problem. They listened, not only to the
experts, and not only to the statistical and fiscal impact
testimony-they listened to the stories of the women and children
who have been devastated by the legal system's historical
tolerance of violence in the home.258
Courts and state actors can distance themselves from problems described
by numbers or impartial observers far more easily than they can from the
individual accounts of experiences in their courtrooms.259
Finally, abandoning the use of narratives in favor of more "objective"
evidence tacitly accepts the premise that women are not credible, and in so
doing, further undermines women's credibility. Because we believe that
courts and state actors won't believe women's stories, we choose not to tell
them. By making that choice, we deprive those entities of the chance to
examine or to change their opinions about women's credibility. We can
never hope to change the perception that battered women are not credible if
we stop offering those who we seek to persuade an opportunity to see these
women in a different light.
IX. CONCLUSION
Almost three years have passed since Battered Mothers Speak Out was
first issued and little has changed in the Massachusetts family courts. The
work of the Battered Mothers' Testimony Project has been slowed by a lack
of funding. And yet, week after week, battered mothers call the project to
tell their stories: stories of discrimination, humiliation and, as the Project
would argue, human rights abuses perpetrated by judges and other state
actors in the Massachusetts family court system. If only judges could hear
these stories-without the pretext of "junk science" or the blinders of
gender bias-perhaps the family courts could better protect the battered
women and children who seek their assistance.
258. Murphy, supra note 9, at 1293. This quote also points to the power of combining
narrative with other types of evidence.
259. This analysis begs the question of whether judges really care about the problems
articulated by those using the system. Is satisfaction of litigants part of their mission? Are other
issues more important to the judges? Mark Massoud's study of the Battered Mothers'
Testimony Project suggests that even as they publicly dismissed the mothers' claims, the judges
did care about the issues raised by the report. Massoud, supra note 5, at 29.
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